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Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion
and Unconscionability
*
RichardL. Barnes

The doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability owe their
existence to the power of the libertarian model of bargaining. The
premise of this Article is that the concept of objectivity has made
adhesion and unconscionability doctrines of convenience, helpful
in fine tuning the powerful concept of objectivity in that libertarian
model. The conclusion reached is that both of these limiting
doctrines are a product of the objective theory and serve
complementary purposes. This Article asserts that the purpose of
the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability is to save the
objective theory of contracts from troublesome over breadth.
This Article begins with a description of the objective and
subjective theories of contract enforceability. It will be shown that
the traditional definition of contract as an objective bargain-in-fact'
of the parties leaves too much to the imagination between the
parties. Can individuals create a bargain for what is illegal? The
libertarian answer would be yes, but the traditional objective
doctrine hedges.
Some well-recognized limitations will be
elaborated to show that the presence of consideration
in an
2
objective exchange is not enough to ensure its validity.
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.

*Professor of Law and Leonard B. Melvin, Jr. Distinguished Lecturer in
Law, University of Mississippi. B.A., J.D., 1976, 1979, University of Arizona;
LL.M., 1983 Northwestern University. My thanks go to Michael Gorman, U of
M Class of 2007, for his help finding materials to support the ideas presented
here.
1. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). Compare U.C.C. § 1201 (b)(3) (agreement defined), with § 1-201 (b)(12) (contract defined) (2004).
2. For instance, the Restatement limits contracts to those promises for
which the law will provide a remedy. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1.
To ensure that the law will enforce our structured agreements as contracts, do
we seal our bargains with a kiss, a hand shake, a wax seal, or some other
formality? Does ceremony count for more than what is in the minds and hearts
of the parties? If a term contained in a license agreement seen only as a pulldown menu on a computer screen, an agreement that is neither dickered nor
even available except as hard-to-read dense print offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, can create a binding contract, then we are much closer to the wax seal of
ancient pre-commerce than we are to the libertarian model of genuine
bargained-for exchange that modem commercial law posits. Is there liberty of
action when the liberty is presumptive and proformarather than genuine?
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IllustrationOne

A highway robber waylaid a stage coach and killed the
driver. He then said to the passengers: "Your valuables or
your lives." When they complied there was no more than that,
compliance. Notwithstanding the fact that there was language
does not mean
of choice, an objectively expressed exchange
3
that there was a bargained for exchange.
Adopting the form of an exchange should not be a privilege to
commit a tort or a crime.4 Adhesion and unconscionability are
useful, in part because they help us identify other instances of form
over substance. Their vigor reduces tensions in the Law of
Contracts which arise through the dominance of objectivity. We
know there are times when we must lift the mask of formula used
by the robber and other bad actors.
This Article will elaborate on the distinction between the
objective and subjective models of contract.5 Next, a group of
significant cases, all of which deal with the doctrines of adhesion
and unconscionability as limitations on contract power, will be
examined for traces of this unresolved conflict.
This Article proposes that there is great value in retaining some
One
subjectivity as the basis for contract enforcement.
conventional area in which this subjectivity is used is in
3. 7 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 28.2, at 39 (rev. ed. 2002).
Interestingly enough the treatise points out that in early English jurisprudence it
took more than threats of loss of goods or even imprisonment to amount to
duress. Only actual imprisonment or the threats of loss of limb or life were
duress. The reason was that all else was compensable in damages, so the threat
should be resistible. Id. Here is the kind of evolution that seems not only
plausible, but intuitive. We accept this, and I suggest a similar evolution in
understanding assent as an evolving concept in this article.
4. Id.
5. Carnival CruiseLines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991),
will be used to illustrate a traditional, too quick reliance on the construct we call
the "bargained-for-exchange." This construct will be shown to leave as much,
or more, unresolved as it solves. When the law of contracts accepted the
"objective" theory of contract bargaining, it precluded the only possible route to
true understanding of a bargain-that is, the subjective meeting of the minds
that can be reached only through some true understanding of what both parties
together intended. While this loss is real, I do not suggest that the loss itself is
controversial.
Instead, I suggest a way to reintegrate adhesion and
unconscionability by looking at the nature of the bargaining relationship and the
depth of bargain-in-fact reached by the parties.
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misunderstandings which can only be discovered and resolved
through subjectivity. 6 This concededly radical proposition is made
less so by limitations on it which will be introduced below.
Conventionality will be supported by two themes carried
throughout this Article.
The first is that adhesion and
unconscionability are to formation what misunderstanding is to
interpretation. They should be seen and used in a way that makes
them akin to an interpretive gloss on the theory of objective
formation. They should not be seen as an antithetical alternative to
objectivity. No contest for supremacy will be played.
Second, by being forthright in our application of these modest
interpretive devices we save the more manipulative devices which
skirt formation, but still erode objectivity of meaning. 7 Judges
have demonstrated their desire for subjectivity. That desire is the
reason that two major sources of contract law, the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) and the Restatement Second of Contracts
(Restatement), speak of unfair surprise as one concern in
unconscionability. However, to do the real work we need to
connect the unfairness with the lack of assent rather than the result.
Some bargains should not be enforced even though their substance
is acceptable. They should be rejected solely on the basis of their
lack of fair bargaining. If a deal is created by power that presents
only the appearance of genuine assent, then the interest of the law
in protecting objectivity largely disappears. A lack of genuine
assent makes these transactions more akin to robbery than contract.

6. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1981).
7. In Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971), the
court acknowledged the duty to read, but also noted the difficulty to do that due
to fine print and lack of headings. The court concluded that the party who seeks
to enforce a contract exculpating himself from negligence should have the
burden of proving that the provisions were explained and understood. Id. at 148.
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture,350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the
court refused to enforce a cruel provision for repossession because of the
obscurity of the language, difficulty to comprehend its effect, and the low
income and lack of education of the buyer. Id. at 449-50. "In such a case the
usual rule [objective manifestation] that the terms of the agreement are not to be
questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the
terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld." Id.;
see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 73-74 (N.J. 1960)
(refused to enforce a warranty that would have limited the remedy for a
defective steering wheel to replacement of the part because the clause was
difficult to find, difficult to read, and nearly impossible for the consumer to
understand).
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Where the bargained-for-exchange is not genuine, we need to be
able to say this in a forthright manner.8
These tools of adhesion and unconscionability remove some of
the pressure from other doctrines and devices. While both require
an examination of the circumstances and result of the objective
bargain, their directness reduces the reliance on other doctrines
which appear more conventional, more doctrinaire, but, in
actuality, can be manipulative and result-oriented. Whether direct
or manipulative, some inquiry into the bargain is hard to resist
because of the over breadth of the objectivist approach. Both
adhesion and unconscionability can reinforce objectivity. By
making legitimacy of the bargain a frank issue, they can alleviate a
glut of untenable decisions that would result from a purely
objective system. They are conveniences,
if not necessities, given
9
the resiliency of the objective theory.
What will emerge throughout this Article is an analytical
approach that heightens our sensitivity about the assent of the
parties by asking if we can separate assent to the transaction as a
whole from the assent that implicitly attaches to the lesser included
terms of the transaction. For this purpose it is helpful to look at the
8. Adhesion and unconscionability share the referents of oppression and
unfair surprise found in the UCC and the Restatement. See U.C.C. § 2-302
(2004); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208. The comments to both
sections mention these elements.

9.
But the objectivists also went too far. They tried (1) to treat virtually
all the varieties of contractual arrangements in the same way, and (2),
as to all contracts in all their phases, to exclude, as legally irrelevant,
consideration of the actual intention of the parties or either of them, as
distinguished from the outward manifestation of that intention. The
objectivists transferred from the field of torts that stubborn antisubjectivist, the "reasonable man"; so that, in part at least, advocacy of
the "objective" standard in contracts appears to have represented a
desire for legal symmetry, legal uniformity, a desire seemingly
prompted by aesthetic impulses.
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2nd Cir. 1946) (Frank, C.J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted).
The objective theory has been especially powerful in specialized industries
such as that of insurance. Professor Keeton first formulated the rule in this way:
"[T]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries . . . will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."
Robert E. Keeton,
InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with PolicyProvisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961,
967 (1970). This is just a nuance on the traditional rule that if the contract term
is not understandable, the provision will be interpreted in light of the objective
and reasonable expectations of the average consumer. Id.
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assent as one of three types: (1) was the deal in the nature of a
take-it-or-leave-it transaction because one of the parties was
unwilling to bargain and was in a position to impose, (2) were the
circumstances or process of the transaction such that no bargaining
was expected, or (3) were the circumstances or process such that,
despite bargaining over some terms, ignorance of other terms was
the reasonable expectation of the parties. If it is concluded that
one of these three patterns fits the transaction, the contract should
be viewed as adhesive.
This does not mean the agreement should be unenforceable.
Adhesive contracts are not unenforceable solely because of their
adhesiveness. We can reinforce the objective theory of contracts
and come to a fairer representation of the actual agreement if we
enforce the deal, but refuse to enforce those terms which are unfair
surprises or would result in unexpected harshness. Just to create a
clear line from the outset, harsh is not the equivalent of
It is assumed that the doctrine of
unconscionable.
Adhesion
unconscionability will remain as an alternative.
complements it by recognizing that some bargains should not be
enforced because there is inadequate assent to what may be unfair
or harsh terms. Inadequate assent does not mean that the resultant
terms will necessarily be unconscionable. The essence of this
analytical model is a constant quest for the reasonable expectations
of the parties which requires interpretation, construction, and gapfilling.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY

IllustrationTwo
A clever and personable felon approaches a pensioner with
a story. She is working her way through college selling a
satellite-based Internet service. She hastens to add that she
knows the pensioner is probably not interested, but she will get
paid a twenty dollar fee if the pensioner will fill out and sign a
form attesting to her visit, the positive impression she made,
and the positive image of the company. He may still decline to
purchase the service. The pensioner is charmed, reads the
form, and signs it. The felon thanks the mark, the door is
closed, and the felon walks away with the form. Later, in her
expensive sports coupe, she peels off the upper layer of the
paper to reveal a promissory note. It recites that pensioner
made a purchase and is obligated to pay one thousand dollars.
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After collecting several of these, she discounts them to a good
faith purchaser and leaves town with the cash.' 0
If we use the analytical tool above we quickly conclude that
this is a case in which the failure of assent is so significant as to
preclude a contract. It is as much a failure of assent as it is a
robbery. Some courts recognize this lack of assent. Other courts
have resisted even this modest infringement on objectivity. They
have concluded that the agreement is enforceable, but because of
the fraud,
the terms are subject to reformation in appropriate
11
cases.
Let us begin with an uncontroversial proposition: basic
hornbook material. Modem commercial realities demand that the
12
law largely abandon the subjective in favor of the objective.
Whether this preference for the objective, reasonable expectations,
over the subjective, the personal and peculiar, was the product of
the industrial economy or helped to produce it is beyond this
project. 13 Either way there is little doubt that the objective
conception of contracts occupies the field. 14 In all fifty states, the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions on sales of goods, which are
an attempt to state the rules of that commercial world, emphasize
objective rules.' 5 In many of its most significant provisions10. This type of fraud, called fraud in the factum, is defined by the lack of
knowledge of the real facts and the lack of opportunity to discover them. See
Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts § 9.22, at 354-55 (5th ed.
2003). In other words, it is a classic blend of subjective and objective
innocence. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1) & cmt. 1. Sometimes called real fraud or
essential fraud, it is a "real" defense that is good even against a holder in due
course, such as the one posited here. See U.C.C. § 3-305(b).
11. 7 Perillo, supra note 3, § 29.9, at 408.
12. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 1.7, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1999); John
Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 30, at 61-64 (4th ed. 2001).
13. Compare Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 629-31 (1943), with
Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 1.7, at 19-21.
14. Murray, supra note 12, § 30, at 63-64.
15. What the UCC suggests is a view of contracts, not as an actual bargain,
but rather a core bargain of actual agreement surrounded by apparent agreement
and even implicit agreement. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 (Official Text 2003)
(pre-amendment 2003, currently adopted in all fifty states), with U.C.C. § 2-207
(Revision 2003) (not yet adopted in any jurisdiction). This radical rewrite of the
section appears to call for a bargain only as to those terms to which the parties
have agreed either explicitly through their forms or through other genuine
assent. Id. It is a product of legal fiction, a fiction created by the law or what
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especially those involving quality, quantity, price, and warrantythe repeated talisman of the UCC is "reasonable" or some
equivalent. 16 The actual bargain is the first source, but not the only
source. 17

The classic doctrine which protected the objective theory of
contract is that of the duty to read and understand.' 8 It is a
foundational idea of the objective theory of contracts because it
requires the parties to take responsibility for those things which are
in the contract. This responsibility for written terms is said to
override any subjectively held expectations' 9 and even to override
other express terms stated at or before the bargain was

the law presumes to be the reasonable understanding of the parties without
regard to actual understanding. Professor Karl Llewellyn expressed this idea
during the time period he worked on the UCC as chief draftsman of Article 2.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370-71
(1960). Llewellyn expressed it as a consideration of what makes boilerplate
clauses different. Instead of thinking of boilerplate clauses which have been
dickered over, we ought to see that there are only a few dickered terms, which
establish broad outlines of the transaction and form its framework. Id. Then the
framework gives a blanket assent to any terms not unreasonable or indecent that
the seller may include as boilerplate. Id. Llewellyn's contributions were
plentiful, but include the innovations of section 2-207 and the normative concept
of unconscionability in section 2-302 which adds the third layer, one offering
resolution of the conflict by use of so-called gap-fillers. Terms that are not
written are often found in the context and purpose of the transaction. An
example from classic contract cases is that of the covenant of good faith effort
found in Woodv. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2004) (open price to be a reasonable price), §
2-306 (output or requirements quantity to be a reasonable amount), § 2-309
(open delivery time to be a reasonable time), § 2-103(1)(j) (good faith to include
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing).
17. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(1), with § 2-207 (3).
18. See, e.g., Dugan v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 344 F.3d 662, 667-68 (7th
Cir. 2003); Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonnebom, 225 A.2d 470, 473-74 (Md.
1967).
19. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 215 states: "where there is a
binding agreement [defined in section 209 as a written agreement], either
completely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements or negotiations is not admissible in evidence to contradict a term of
the writing." Section 216 allows consistent additional terms only where there is
not complete integration. Restatement (Second) ofContracts § 216 (1) (1981).
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memorialized. 20 These objective terms control even
though they
21
may not be the product of dickering or negotiation.
The law established "Contract" as a creature of special
circumstance.
Consideration was the defining special
circumstance.
Consideration limited enforceable promises to
those where something more than promise was present.23
Consideration took care of the bulk of commercial agreements and,
therefore, large commercial interests in the age of pre-industrial
commerce were comfortable with it. 24 One historian of the law
concluded that America presented the ideal case for testing the idea
of libertarian economic growth.25 It was the ascendancy of
freedom of contract that made the objective view the dominant
model in the early law merchant,26 and the industrial revolution
with its liberal economic theory reinforced it and firmed its
acceptance. 27 So strong was the economic influence, that by the
end of the nineteenth century the bargained-for-exchange and
consideration were firmly established doctrines. Nevertheless,
already changing
economic conditions were making the doctrines
28
less important. g

20. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 215, 216.
21. Consider again the consumer who goes into a big box retailer to
purchase a vacuum cleaner. The outside of the box clearly states the price,
which is $100, and also states that the warranty is for ninety days and is valid
only if the goods are returned to the original manufacturer for replacement. It is
the apparent policy of many of the major retailers, including Target, Wal-Mart,
Costco, J.C. Penney, K-Mart, Sears Roebuck & Co., and Sam's Club, to accept
return of recent purchases when accompanied by a receipt or, in some cases, just
store markings that show the item was purchased from that retailer. By placing
the explicit language of warranty inside the container, the retailers have created
a reasonable expectation of something quite different from those terms. They
have separated the questions of what is the total bargain and what is the
warranty. By this separation the sellers have removed the possibility of a
bargained-for exchange on dickered terms and have even eliminated a
bargained-for exchange on dictated terms with notice. For this reason, this is a
classic adhesive, take it or leave it, contract without notice of other possibilities.
22. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 1.6, at 18-19.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 19.
25. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United States 18 (1956).
26. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 1.7, at 20.
27. Kessler, supranote 13, at 629-31.
28. Famsworth, supranote 12, § 1.7, at 20.
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It was, in fact, the nineteenth century's developing socioeconomic influences that brought with them a number of
changes.29 Western economies adopted the idea of freedom of
action within a sphere of influence allowing individuals to control
their own debt. 30 Perhaps it was the presumptive democratic value,
but it was widely accepted as the natural order for a society
emerginq as an industrial economy to have libertarian contract
features.
The legislatures and judges accepted a model of
industrial revolution and organization in which greater scale was
equated with greater good because of maximized welfare. 32 This
brought standardization of goods and contracts as the necessary
partners in an efficient society.33
29. Id.at 21-22.
30. Kessler, supra note 13, at 638-40. In his landmark article on adhesion
contracts Professor Kessler wrote:
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of
competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has
changed radically. Society, when granting freedom of contract, does
not guarantee that all members of the community will be able to make
use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by protecting the
unequal distribution of property, does nothing to prevent freedom of
contract from becoming a one-sided privilege.
Society, but
proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not interfere
with the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract enables
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more important,
to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the
appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in particular
could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful
industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new
feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals ....Thus
the return back from contract to status which we experience today was
greatly facilitated by the fact that the belief in freedom of contract has
remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of the social
philosophy of our culture.
Id. at 640 (footnote omitted).
31. Id.at 629-30.
32. Id.; see also Murray, supranote 12, § 96, at 545-55.
33. This is neither shocking nor radical. Karl Llewellyn, in drafting the
UCC in the 1940s, recognized his obligation to correctly express current
business norms and practices and to then add normative values where they could
be without radical shifts. It was no more ambitious than looking a bit ahead.
Richard L. Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 117, 158-60 (1989). See also Farnsworth,
supra note 12, § 4.26, at 295-96 (1999). "As with goods the standardization of

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66

IllustrationThree
A drover of cattle is offered shipment of his cattle from
Buffalo to Albany on the only railroad available. He is offered
the tariff price or, if wishes, he may ride in the car and
maintain control of his cattle. If he chooses this, his fare is
"free" and the price is one-third of the "tariff' rate. He
chooses, as do all other shippers, the lower rate as it is the only
practicable rate for a profit. Along the way the drover is
injured through the negligence of the employees of the railroad.
The railroad points to a release of liability in the contract which
specifies it is part
34 of the consideration for the "free" passage
price.
lower
and
Illustration Three is based on the facts of N.Y. CentralR.R. Co.
v. Lockwood.3 5 The Supreme Court refused to enforce the
exculpatory clause. 36 The opinion is a marvelous examination of
the precedents, extending back more than a century into English
law, as well as a good survey of the leading state rules. 37 While
New York was one of the more liberal jurisdictions in allowing
exculpation, the Court felt the need to deny the effect asked for by
the railroad.38 The Court's reasoning was reflective and its
analysis careful. The Lockwood contract was squarely within
category two of the analytical device proposed here. This category
is for those situations where we conclude that the circumstances
and process of the bargain were such that bargaining was neither
invited nor expected. This is a classic take-it-or-leave-it deal,
although the Court did not use the phrase.
Sound public policy was offered as the reason why the contract
was unenforceable. Without using any categorical language the
Court found the contract to be adhesive and violative of sound
policy.39 First, "[tihe carrier and his customer [did] not stand on a

footing of equality."40

The customer was one of millions who

and mass production of contracts may serve the interest of both parties." Id. §
4.26, at 296.
34. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 359 (1873).

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.at 383-84.
Id.at 363-78.
Id.at 379-84.
Id.
Id.at 379.
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could not afford to haggle or stand out from the crowd. 4 1 The
railroad was one of the large corporations in whom the power and
wealth of the industry was concentrated.42 Had the drover been
aware of the term there would have been no bargaining. 43 The
railroad's freight agent testified that they made forty or fifty
contracts every week and had carried on the business for years, and
no other arrangement was ever made because the only alternative
offered was
the tariff rate which, at three times the cost, was not
44
feasible.
The Court held:
If the customer had any real freedom of choice, if he had a
reasonable and practicable alternative, and if the
employment of the carrier were not a public one, charging
him with the duty of accommodating the public in the line
of his employment; then, if the customer chose to assume
the risk of negligence, it could with more reason be said to
be his private affair, and no concern of the public. But the
condition of things is entirely different, and especially so
under the modified arrangement which the carrying trade
has assumed. The business is mostly concentrated in a few
powerful corporations, whose position in the body politic
enables them to control it. They do, in fact, control it, and
impose such conditions upon travel and transportation as
they see fit .... These circumstances . . . show that the
conditions imposed by common carriers ought not to4 5be
adverse.., to the dictates of public policy and morality.
The Court concluded that the railroad's obligations were akin
to that of a fiduciary and thus it was charged with a duty to ensure
' 6
that their contracts with the public were "just and reasonable. A
From there it was a short step to the holding that the carrier could
not in justice and reasonableness exculpate itself for negligence.
An informative history of exculpation clauses was given. The
Court pointed out that exculpation clauses came into vogue among
carriers who wished to avoid liability for non-chargeable accidents.
That is, the carriers had at first sought only to avoid liability for
pure accidents for which they were not responsible. The Court
approved of these clauses. The difference between the older
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45.
46.

Id.at 379-80.
Id.at 380-81.
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clauses and this new variety was that the older exemptions were
just and reasonable because they did not amount to an
abandonment of the carrier's obligations to the public. 47 The Court
recognized that standardized forms were being used to work a
change.
They stated:
Conceding, therefore, that special contracts, made by
common carriers with their customers, limiting their
liability, are good and valid so far as they are just and
reasonable; to the extent, for example, of excusing them for
all losses happening by accident, without any negligence or
fraud on their part; when they ask to go still further, and to
be excused for negligence-an excuse so repugnant to the
law of their foundation and to the public good-they have
no longer any plea of justice or reason to support such a
stipulation, but the contrary. And then, the inequality of
the parties, the compulsion under which the customer is
placed, and the obligations of the carrier to the public,
4
operate with full force to divest the transaction of validity.
This is a remarkable foreshadowing of what standardized
contracts are today and offers support for the claims made in this
Article. We should not allow the appearance of bargaining, even
when presented in an objective form, to override the basic sense of
justice inherent in contract law. Contract law calls us to enforce
promises because they carry the imprimatur of assent. We need
not throw out objectivity, but we should be particularly vigilant to
the absence of assent in standardized transactions like the one in
Lockwood. Standard forms allow abuses to develop. Although
they may begin as carefully and consciously crafted terms, their
repeated use routinizes them and diminishes their thoughtfulness.
The routine is then further transformed as small and even
insubstantial mutations occur. At some point the mutations
accumulate and mark a radical break from the expected. It is this
element of surprise that is both inherent in their use and essential to
their economy. Some would say there is a duty to read. 49 This
47. Id. at 381.
48. Id.at 381-82.
49. There are certainly some courts that disagree with this open approach.
At least one court has unapologetically rejected unconscionability founded on
the failure to read or understand by the weaker party in a very sophisticated
arrangement. The Seventh Circuit has taken this much sterner approach to the
unconscionability doctrine. In Dugan v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., Dugan brought
suit on behalf of the railroad's employees alleging a failure to make
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Article asks: Should there not also be a duty not to abuse where
the drafter can hide unfair surprises?5
Standard forms create tension in an evolving economy.
Standardization saves transactional costs. 5 1 Yet standardization
tends toward rigidity in order to maximize those transactional
savings. Meanwhile goods and services change and the seller
gains sophistication as sales transactions accumulate. The seller,
as contract drafter, stays ahead of the expectations of its consumers
by the sheer volume of information he obtains about the good or
service. Standardized forms will trail the knowledge curve of the
seller unless the forms integrate the changing information. If they
do integrate change, they will drag with them the substantive terms
of the bargain. This means that the consumer becomes a reluctant
or uninformed subject, an ongoing experiment, a laboratory mouse,
as was Mr. Lockwood. If sellers stretch to accommodate new

contributions to an ERISA plan that were required by the collective bargaining
agreement with the union. 344 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003). The question was
one of pension contributions for "casual employees." Id. The question hinged
on a clause in the contract defining "casual employee" and whether this
definition, which was spelled out in a "boilerplate" provision, was affected by
prior agreements between the parties. Id. at 667. The court, in examining the
provision, rejected Dugan's argument that the provision was unenforceable
because it was "boilerplate." Id. The court said "there is no 'mere boilerplate
defense' to a suit for breach of contract any more than there is a 'fine print' or 'I
didn't read it' defense." Id. The court explained this by saying: "allowing such
defenses would be a throwback to the era of exaggerated concern with the
supposed one-sidedness of form or standard contracts denigrated as 'contracts of
adhesion."' Id. at 668. The court then further explained:
Widespread judicial suspicion of the form contract-the dreaded
"contract of adhesion," the contract that is offered by the authoring
party on a take it or leave it basis rather than being negotiated between
the parties ... has never crystallized ... in a rule making such contracts
unenforceable, on grounds of fraud or duress or unconscionability or
mistake or what have you, or even presumptively unenforceable ....
Although the vagueness of the concept of unconscionability may seem
to place contracts of adhesion under a cloud, they are generally upheld
against attacks from that direction.
Id. (quoting Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donnovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
50. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1981) (a contract is to be
interpreted in accordance with the expectations of one party where the other
party is aware of the misunderstanding).
51. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 4.26, at 295-96.
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patterns and transactions, but use standard forms, there will be
inevitable stretch marks. These marks are camouflaged by law's
desire for the public to see these forms as typical and ordinary. All
the while the marketer introduces change, inevitable change,
5y
changes.
The continued presumption of assent
because commerce
fail.
must at some point
II. THE NEED FOR SUBJECTIVITY TO LIMIT OBJECTIVITY IN
FORMATION

Illustration Four
Baffle approached Wiggle about the purchase of goods
from the colonies. Wiggle agreed to provide the goods and
these goods would arrive on a ship called the Pinafore.
Unknown to either there were two such ships, the first sailing
in October and the second in December. Baffle meant the
earlier, and Wiggle intended the later.
In Raffles v. Wichelhaus 53 the seller and buyer agreed to the
shipment of Indian cotton and its purchase in Liverpool upon the
arrival of the ship Peerless. 54 The court determined that there was
no contract. 55 The resolution turned on there being a "latent"
ambiguity which was discovered through parol evidence supplied
by the parties.56 There beinf
no basis for choosing one over the
5
other, there was no contract.
Contrast this result to that in a well-know case which asks,
"What is Chicken?, 58 Judge Friendly decided that there was a
contract between a shipper of chicken and a Swiss importer who
bought the goods it described as "chicken." On appeal, the
importer wished to confine the word to mean only chickens of a
certain quality on the basis that trade usage meant young chicken
suitable for broiling or baking. The importer contended that a
52. Id.; see also Barnes, supranote 33, at 158-60.
53. 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ct. of Exchq. 1864).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 20 would reach the same
result. There the rule is that a misunderstanding creates no binding assent if
there is a materially different meaning attached and the parties do not know of
each other's meaning or have no reason to know of the other's meaning.
58. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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broader class encompassing those generally marketed for stewing
would have been called "fowl., 59 Judge Friendly did not find a
misunderstanding which canceled the agreement. Instead he
determined that the word should be given its ordinary or
reasonable meaning absent persuasive evidence that it was used in
a more specific or atypical sense. 60 Judge Friendly conceded that
the word "chicken" was ambiguous; 6 ' however, there was a failure
to prove the trade usage and other evidence of extrinsic meaning
was mixed. 62 Friendly's conclusion is instructive. Because the
importer failed to show the significance of his subjective meaning,
the seller's subjective meaning was significant, but63only because it
coincided with the objective meaning of "chicken."
Where there is a misunderstanding between the parties the
contract can be avoided if there are materially different meanings
and those meanings are known by one of the parties, but not to the
other. In this case, the importer must suffer the attribution of the
ordinary meaning, the linguistic convention. It is a meaning all of
us should be aware of and therefore it was incumbent upon the
importer to resolve any ambiguity. It is a situation of wrongful or
negligent misunderstanding.
By contrast, in Peerless, the
linguistic symbol used was a ship's proper name which was
ambiguous only upon examination with specialized knowledge.
The knowledge of two ships named Peerless was not widespread
and should not necessarily have been known to either party to the
cotton contract. It was not a case of wrongful or negligent
misunderstanding.
Justice Holmes said:
While other words may mean different things, a proper
name means one person or thing and no other . . . . In
theory of speech your name means you and my name
means me, and the two names are different. They are
different words .... [H]ere the parties have
64 said different
things and never have expressed a contract.
For the objectivist this is a necessary theory to explain the case
if its holding is to be preserved. It makes names into unmistakable
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. "Since the word 'chicken' standing alone is ambiguous, I turn first to
see whether the contract itself offers any aid to its interpretation." Id at 118.
62. Id. at 119.
63. Id.
64. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 417, 418 (1899).
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symbols. One is not interchangeable with another. It does not
explain why the subjective inquiry was foregone. Following the
The
Restatement of Contracts would prove much easier.
Restatement suggests that we begin with a presumption of
objective meaning and set it aside where there is clearly a material
difference and that 65difference is not the result of wrongful or
negligent ignorance.
These cases suggest both the power and the limitations of
objectivity and subjectivity. The Raffles case is one where the
court must look at subjective intent. Frigaliment,the "Chicken
Case," is one where the court could remain objective. Unlike
Raffles, there was no fundamental misunderstanding in
Frigaliment. All of the parties attributed different meanings to the
word chicken and these meanings did not lead to a
misunderstanding. Instead the misunderstanding was founded on a
failure of the parties to recognize the other person's meaning. The
analogous case in Raffles would have been if one of the parties had
been aware of the ambiguity and chose not to address it. In
Frigaliment,the importer, a Swiss buyer, used the term chicken
which he understood to be limited to young chickens, but which he
also knew was a term other people might use more broadly. In that
circumstance, the objectivity principal should override any
concerns about subjective intent. Notice that the effect of this is to
encourage parties to clear up ambiguities where they are known to
exist, but not to punish either party where the ambiguities are latent
and could not have been 6rovided for by the parties. Thus a
neutral error falls neutrally.
III. ADHESION: A SIGN THAT

OBJECTIVITY HAS NOT FULLY
DIGESTED THE SUBJECTIVITY MEAL

65. Of similar import is Oswald v. Allen. 285 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). In this case Dr. Oswald was denied enforcement of a contract to
purchase the Swiss coin collection of Mrs. Allen. Mrs. Allen had divided her
coins between the Swiss Coin Collection and the Rarity Coin Collection, but
showed all of them to Dr. Oswald who thereafter negotiated a purchase of her
Swiss Coin Collection. Id. The court denied recovery on the theory of
The factors are tantalizingly
Id. at 492.
subjective misunderstanding.
interspaced between Raffles and Frigaliment. Names are involved, but they are
personal names assigned by Mrs. Allen. Id. at 489-91. There was considerable
interaction, but because of a difference in native language there was little true
understanding. Id. at 492.
66. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1981).
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Where does the division between subjectivity and objectivity
originate? These two approaches are at the core of the law's
determination of which agreements to enforce. One perceptive
author said:
No legal system has ever been reckless enough to make all
promises enforceable. As a legal philosopher expressed,
some freedom to change one's mind is essential "for free
intercourse between those who lack conscience," and most
of us "would shudder at the idea of being bound by every
promise, the matter how foolish, without a chance
of
67
lighting increased wisdom undo past foolishness."
68
Every legal system must have some limitation on contract.
According to this conventional view the limitation lies in the
requirement of mutuality of obligation. 69
There are two requirements for an agreement to have
70
mutuality. These two requirements are assent and definiteness.
It is in the requirement of assent that the controversy develops.
Professor Williston observed that there was a common
misconception that a meeting of mental attitudes between the
parties was needed for contract. The conception of a metaphysical,
but mutual and simultaneous
understanding was referred to as a
"meeting of the minds.",7 1 This view held sway in the courts of
America and England during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, but was passd by the middle of the nineteenth
century. 72 From the substantial rejection of this simple-minded
approach, the
conclusion is reached that the law now favors
73
objectivity.
Unconscionablitiy has found more notoriety of late by its
inclusion in the UCC and Restatement Second.
However, it is
adhesion that has given the law more experience in the commercial
practices of merchants. Adhesion was a fictional construct used by
commentators to describe what was being readily accepted by a
variety of actors in industries which benefited from an economy of
67. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 1.5, at 11.
68. Murray, supranote 12, § 3, at 4-5.
69. Id.
70. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 3.1, at 110.
71. Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formationof Contracts, 14 Ill.
L. R. 85, 86 (1919-20).
72. Id. at 85-87.
73. Murray, supranote 12, § 30, at 63--64.
74. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208

(1981).
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scale.
For instance, insurers, common carriers, shippers,
warehousemen, 75 and employers have all been the beneficiaries of
mass marketing and therefore mass or standard form contractsthe so called off-the-shelf deal. It is a doctrine that developed
along with the rise of objectivity. Adhesion fits comfortably, more
comfortably than unconscionability which is an external value
imposed on the commercial world. Adhesion asks a basic
question: Can we fit notions of economy of scale within the
greater body of contract law? The basic answer is that contract can
exist even if the agreement is more about take-it-or-leave-it terms
than it is about the willing exchange of mutual obligation.76 The
claim, developed below, is that we must be wary of the
implications in this basic answer.
Adhesion is objectivity triumphant. It is form over substance. 77
Adhesiveness alone does not void these routinized deals. To
overcome the objectivity of a written or otherwise acknowledged
agreement the courts require a second element. The bargain struck
must denigrate some significant policy to make them unacceptable
as contracts. Exculpatory clauses imposed by an employer on its
employees are an example. 78 A diminishing number of courts trust
agreements to place the insurable risk on one party or the other,

75. See Murray Seasongood, DrasticPledge Agreements, 29 Harv. L. Rev.
277 (1915-16) (describing abusive and unfair terms which have been voided in
various pledge situations including pawn brokers and bailments).
76. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71.
77. Professor Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter for the UCC, suggested
that bargains do not fit neatly into the objective, subjective model. Llewellyn
expressed it this way:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few ticker terms,
and abroad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. The one
thing more is' a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or in decent terms the seller may have on his form, which
do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
Llewellyn, supranote 15, at 370.
78. See generallyK.A. Drechsler, Validity of ContractualProvisionby One
Other than Carrier or Employer for Exemption from Liability, or
Indemnification,for Consequences of Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
While many courts were uncomfortable with the concept of exculpating oneself
from reckless, intentional or even gross negligent conduct, others were relatively
sanguine. 53 Am. Jur. § 158, 221 (1970).
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allowing ne1igence to be shifted back and forth as a risk of
employment.

Unconscionability has roots deep
adhesion in that the court need only
shocks the conscience. While this
question of procedural and substantive
formula has captured the audience.

in equity. It differs from
decide that the agreement
has been expressed as a
limits in bargaining, no one

IllustrationFive
After the birth of her second child Patty Holder decided she
needed life insurance. She went to the local Mega-Life agent
and they talked. They decided on coverage split between term
life and whole life, the latter having an investment return
feature. They settled on the amount of coverage and an
appointment for a brief physical was made. Patty wrote a
check as a "binder" with the understanding that after passing
the physical the coverage would be approved and the policy
sent to her. No other significant terms were discussed.
This illustration suggests adhesion as opposed to
unconscionability. Contracts of adhesion are the result of take-itor-leave-it propositions that appear commercial or contractual, but
are more about the relationship of the parties than they are about a
negotiated bargain. Adhesion is a doctrine accumulated from the
detritus of failed contracts across time. One plausible theory of
adhesion's linguistic origin is the French perception of certain
international agreements. There are treaties, originally negotiated
by the core signatory nations, later adopted by other nations who
had no part in the negotiations and therefore no direct role in
crafting language and terms. Yet these non-signatory nations
choose to adhere to the agreements, to enter the relationship of
nation states.
The terminology was picked up as a term of
convenience to describe standard form contracts, especially
standard form contracts in the insurance industry in late nineteenth

79. Id. How these courts came down on one side of the issue or the other is
not germane to this topic. What is important is that they sought to decide the
matter as one ofthe limitation of contract by matters of public policy.
80. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 222 n.106 (1919-1920); Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 4.26, at 29697.
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and early twentieth century America.8 1 Professor Kessler, in his
landmark 1947 article, attributed the creation of the phrase
"contract of adhesion" to Professor Patterson in Patterson's
discussion of life insurance policies at the beginning of the
twentieth century.8 2 Arthur Leff took the language and influenced
our perception of the doctrine with a late twentieth century idiom.
He said adhesion contracts did not involve the haggling or
cooperative drafting of typical
contracts, their creation being
83
"rather of a fly and flypaper."
While much can be said about the possibility of cost savings, it
cannot be ignored that contracts of adhesion can also be used to
increase bargaining power. They can even be tools of oppression.
It is not lack of choice alone which makes them invalid. Hence,
contracts of adhesion have been examined in search of two
separate elements. Early on, lack of choice in combination with a
violation of public policy invalidated adhesive contracts. Later, it
was lack of choice combined with unfair surprise.
Some adhesive contracts present classic situations still found in
tort and contract casebooks:
common carriers exculpating
themselves for tortious acts, 84 employers imposing harsh terms on
their employees,8 5 and insurance company contracts dictated by the
carrier and imposed on the client without bargaining.86 These
81. It is said that they are the product of mass business, of standardized
products and services and an attempt at economy of scale. Farnsworth, supra
note 12, § 4.26, at 296.
82. Kessler, supranote 13, at 632.
83. Arthur A. Leff, Contractas a Thing, 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131, 143 (1970).
For instance, the typical bank account is standard among depositors as is the
typical business machine. Consumers of the service want much the same
features in the service as do purchasers of the business machine. Once approved
for one customer, it makes sense for it to be the standard form offered by the
bank. 1Perillo, supranote 3, § 1.4, at 13-14.
84. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873)
(refusing to enforce an exculpation clause as to a claim by a cattle drover who
was injured through the negligence of the railroad while riding as caretaker of
the cattle he was shipping).
85. Attempts to exonerate the employer from liability for future negligence
are generally void as against public policy. Mathew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal
Issues in Sports Medicine:A Synthesis, Summary, & Analysis, 76 St. John's L.
Rev. 5, 33 (2002).
86. SeeN.YCent. R.R. Co., 84U.S. at 379.
The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. The
latter is-only one individual of a million. He cannot afford to higgle or
stand out and seek redress in the courts. His business will not admit
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in
cases can be found throughout several centuries past 87 and
88
legislatively identified problems within the recent five years.
Contracts are ubiquitous in commerce. The objective model of
contract imposes no requirement that the parties actually haggle,
dicker, or even agree to what is exchanged, only that there is
objective assent in the seeking and giving of value in an

such a course ....
In the present case, for example, the freight agent of
the company testified that though they made forty or fifty contracts
every week like that under consideration, and had carried on the
business for years, no other arrangement than this was ever made with
any drover.
Id. The court then pointed out that the usual, or "tariff," rate for cattle was three
times the amount contracted so that no drover "could afford to pay such tariff
rates." Id.
87. Unconscionability, on the other hand, became part of our lexicon with
the drafting of the UCC in the 1950s. See Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 1.9, at
31-35. It was the model for the Second Restatement when it was drafted in the
1970s. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 308 and UCC section 2-302
are cut from the same cloth. Neither talks about the difference between
procedural and substantive unconscionability as many would like. Neither
attempts to list the factors of unconscionability. Both are understated and
ambiguous. Yet they contain a very powerful concept. They call on the court to
ask whether it is just and fair to enforce the contract. Although oppression and
unfair surprise are mentioned in UCC section 2-302, it is apparent that the
drafters were struggling to articulate the origins of the unconscionability
provision rather than suggesting its limits. In this borderland of contract there
are the passengers such as Mr. Lockwood, the cattle drover injured in New York
Central Railroad Co. v. Lockwood. Mr. Lockwood had no more power to
change the terms offered by the railroad than did the canners who were faced
with a revolt once they had transported their workers to Alaska in Alaska
Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Both involved
economic duress. Both left the party under duress with no choice even though
the formal exchange took place. A court can manipulate doctrine by finding a
pre-existing duty and therefore no valid consideration as the court did in
Domenico, or it can declare exculpation clauses void because they are inherently
unreasonable in the context of a common carrier trying to avoid liability for its
own negligence. See N.Y. Cent. R.R Co., 84 U.S. 357.
88. The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated recommendations
about disclosures in on-line advertising. Jack Winn and Benjamin Wright, Law
of Electronic Commerce § 5.08(C) (Aspen Publishers 2001). More recent still is
the fracas over how on-line search engines such as Google should disclose
sponsorship by some of its search results.
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exchange.8 9 Professor Kessler pointed out that the free enterprise
system of rationality urges us toward and depends upon rationality
of contracts.
Agreements, even though private, should be
respected as agreements by the public law. Free enterprise would
struggle without some method of enforcing the private
arrangements of the parties. Statutory and case law is too general
and unwieldy to provide for specific resolutions of all disputes that
might arise on a case-by-case basis.
Rather than attempt an
ordering of all transactions, the law fosters broad policies and
patterns and allows the parties to
9 1 provide for variations consistent
with these policies and patterns.
Evolution in commerce and especially the development of
92
economies of scale have affected the way we view contracts.
Just as goods and services have become more standardized so have
their agreements. Professor Kessler recognized the usefulness of
adhesive contracts, but he also pointed out that they evolved in
mass marketing situations such as transportation, insurance, and
banking.93 We should understand that adhesiveness and scale of
economy are linked. They form powerful and complementary
tools. 94 This does not mean that they lead to just results. 95 They
89. Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 4.26, at 296-97. See also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981).
90.
In the happy days of free enterprise capitalism the belief that
contracting is law making had largely emotional importance. Law
making by contract was no threat to the harmony of the democratic
system. On the contrary it reaffirmed it. The courts, therefore,
representing the community as a whole, could remain neutral in the
name of freedom of contract. The deterioration of the social order into
the pluralistic society of our days with its powerful pressure groups has
needed to make the wisdom of the contract theory of the natural law
philosophers meaningful to us.
Kessler, supranote 13, at 641.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 631.
93. Id. at 631. The contributions of Professors Patterson and Kessler are
significant, but a bit beyond the scope of the present project. Professor Kessler
said this inner marking would be better if we saw adhesion contracts as
something other than contracts, yet the power of language especially use of the
word contract was such that courts are not likely to stray far from the concept of
the writing as a contract. The insurance field perhaps deserves credit or blame
for the use of adhesion contracts and their early recognition. Id. at 631-32.
94. That society benefits by using standard contracts is evident early on in
the insurance industry, which realized enhanced competition by the use of
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still must stand or fall on their ability to fairly represent the
agreement of the parties and this has long been tested by the
presence of willing assent. Contracts as private law have power
because the parties agree to them. 96 The further we retreat from
genuine bargaining, the further we are from the fundamental power
of contract as a just legal doctrine.
IllustrationSix
Mr. and Mrs. Henningsen visited the local Plymouth dealer
with the intention to buy a new car. After a test drive and some
dickering over the price, the sales agent wrote up an offer sheet
containing the bare bones of the deal. This was signed by the
Henningsens and presented to the manager for his acceptance.
It was accepted and then the long form contract was prepared
for everyone's signature. In the fine print of the contract was
the language on warranty included here in the footnotes.97

standard contracts. This is simply the nature of the type of business involved.
Id. At a time when most people were not even property owners, that is did not
own their own residence, an insurance contract was one of the most significant
writings that they entered into during their lifetimes. The standard contract was
a way to express an important and complex idea in a way that could be modified
and adapted from client to client without additional negotiation. Kessler
credited Professor Patterson for the recognition of the pattern and use of the
"contract of adhesion" in the life insurance business just after the turn of the
twentieth century. Id.
95. Id. at 630-33.
96. Professor Kessler suggested it might be useful if we used a linguistic
symbol other than "contract" to designate these transactions and thereby avoid
indiscriminately applying ordinary rules of contract to them. Id. at 633. He
reminded us that contracts are created by the parties through the system of free
bargaining. As a result, those parties have accepted and established the contract
on "footing of social and approximate economic equality." Their freedom to
deal with one another makes any resulting contract a product of their freedom.
Id. at 630. Where they lack freedom, however, there must be some obvious
constraint on the dealings of the parties. Kessler suggested that contracts of
adhesion should not be viewed as contracts, but he recognized that courts would
inevitably do so. Id. at 633. This Article suggests that adhesion contracts are
not just contracts of a different color, but very different animals from the typical
contract. They look like what we would see if there was true bargaining, but
they are not the result ofbargaining as the law requires.
97. The contract language read as follows:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original

146

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

The facts of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors present a nearly
archetypal case in which the duty to read confronts a contract of
adhesion. Clause Henningsen purchased a 1955 Plymouth sedan
from Bloomfield Motors, Inc. in Bloomfield, New Jersey on May
7, 1955.98 He purchased the car for his wife, Helen Henningsen, as
a Mother's Day gift. 99 While she was present at the dealership and
helped to select the car, Mrs. Henningsen was not a party to the
purchase contract.' 0 On May 19, Mrs. Henningsen was driving in
Highlands, New Jersey when she heard a sharp crack from under
the front of the car. l r The steering wheel spun in her hand, and
the car veered ninety degrees to the right, hitting a highway sign
and running into a brick
wall.10 2 Mrs. Henningsen was injured and
03
1
totaled.
the car was
The terms of the automobile sale were those offered by
Chrysler, the manufacturer, and Bloomfield Motors, the seller, to
the buyer, on the seller's form contract. They were offered by the
salesman, as agent for the seller and manufacturer.' 0 4 The

equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis or
parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material or
workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligations under this
warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts
thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such
vehicle to the originalpurchaseror before such vehicle has been driven
4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur, be returned to it with
transportation charges prepaid and which its examination shall disclose
to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being
expressly in lieu of all other warrantiesexpressed or implied, and all
other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor
authorizes any other person to assume for it any other liability in
connection with the sale of its vehicles.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 74 (N.J. 1960).
98. Id. at 73.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 75.
102. Id.
103. Mr. Henningsen's claims were for property damages, medical expenses,
and for loss of his "wife's society and services" as a result of the wreck. The
court upheld his award of damages as derivative from his wife's claims. Id. at
101.
104. Id. at 78.
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salesman had no authority to vary the terms. 105 There was no
alternative in the marketplace because 0 6all the major American
manufacturers used a standard warranty.1
Most of the printing on the standard purchase form was in
twelve-point block type, but six-point solid type was used in two
paragraphs above the signature line. 10 7 The paragraph relevant to
this brief stated, "I have read the matter printed on the back hereof
and agree to it as a part of this order the same as if it were printed
above my signature. I certify that I am 21 years of age, or older,
and hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this order.' 0 8 No
other reference was made to the terms in the above paragraph, and
Mr. Henningsen testified that he did09not read the six-point solidtype paragraphs above his signature. 1
Mr. Henningsen also did not read the express warranty on the
back of the contract, which was referenced by the six-point solid
type paragraph above.' 10 The terms on the back were contained in
eight and one-half inches of fine printI 1 and ten paragraphs
consisting of a total of sixty-five lines." 2 The express warranty
provided that it only applied to the original purchaser for ninety
days or 4,000 miles and only covered the replacement of defective
parts. 113
What was present was a minimum of bargaining." 4 This led to
a form contract which was the instrument ofthe seller and, whether
or not read, was a contract under the traditional duty to read
doctrine.11 5 First, the court noted that "the traditional contract is
the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought together by
105. Id. at 87.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 73.
108. Id. at 74. For sake of comparison, the main text of this brief is in
twelve-point double-spaced font, and the endnote text is in ten-point singlespaced font. The following is the same quotation from the Henningsen contract
in six-point solid-spacing font:
I have readthematter printed on thebackhereof and agreeto it asa par of thisorder thesameasif it were printed above
my signature. I certify that I am 21 years of age,or older, andhereby acknowledge reetpt of a copy of thi order.

109. Id.
110. Id. at74.
111. The court notes that the print was not as extreme as the six-point solidtype. The court does not state the actual point size of the type on the back of the
form, but only that the type was "fine print." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at87.
115. Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonnebom, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967).
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the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of
approximate economic equality."" 6 This environment was not
present between the Henningsens and Chrysler; rather, the modem
landscape of standardized mass contracts, which are used by
companies of infinitely greater bargaining power to impose their
terms on the weaker consumer who needs the manufacturers'
products, controlled their contract." 7 The Henningsens were not
in a position to shop around for a better warranty because all
automobile manufacturers employed a similar exculpatory, express
warranty." 8 Instead of a meeting of the minds, Chrysler was9 able
to impose its will on the Henningsens as if its will were law. 1
But this is quite different from the insurance industry's
standard form. Standard forms began as a way to save costs where
bargaining over non-controversial terms would have resulted in the
standard version anyway. In early insurance practice it would have
been assumed that the full policy would be unobjectionable and
that if it was later discovered to contain some unexpected
substance, it could be modified or the policy canceled upon
objection. This is significantly different from the insurance terms
and the like which gave rise to standard, form, adhesive contracts.
If we had asked the Henningsens if they were interested in the
warranty term the probable answer would have been "yes." In
addition, the lengths to which the manufacturer went to obscure the
language and its meaning suggests a desire not to bargain and an
awareness that interest would have been excited had the terms been
understood. This is no longer the recognition of a predetermined
and uncontested result that arose from a lack of interest. This
behavior by the seller and manufacturer is suspect, as it was in the
Lockwood case. The industry sought, in both cases, to change the
substance of the bargain by adjusting obscure terms in standard
contracts. It is an extraordinary imposition and an unfair surprise
arrived at by disguising it as the commonplace and the routine.
We might have been better off to apply some tagline such as quasicontract to these deals which result from adhesive situations.
120
Those who urged the use of traditional contract language won.
116. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 86.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 87.
119. Id. at86.
120. See Perillo, supra note 10, § 9.43, at 399-400 (discussing Henningsen,
161 A.2d at 95). This text claims that while there was discussion about assent in
Henningsen, the "ultimate holding" was that it was invalid as unconscionable.
Id. at 401. While the claim is that this is shown by the court's refusal to
consider a charge to the jury on the basis of lack of assent, this is a misplaced
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By being sensitive to the origin of adhesion we can use
objectivity to ask whether there really was a bargain. Contracts of
adhesion are no longer merely a device to cut costs in a mass
marketing situation. They are used for their substantive role of
avoiding disagreements and imposing terms on the other party.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors is a good example. Bloomfield
Motors was less concerned about mass marketing than it was the
imposition of a substantive term by its use of the industry-wide
warranty clause. This was more than mass market efficiency. It
was an imposition of a harsh term. Rather than being the product
of reasonable expectations, it was the product of clever advantagetaking packaged as a deal. That is not to say that the dealership did
not enjoy some scale of economy by including the warranty
provision in all consumer contracts as boilerplate. Surely they did.
Rather, the purpose of that provision was not mass marketing and
boilerplate efficiency, it was to impose a term, all the while
knowing that this would occur because the buyer would be
unaware or have no power to object.
IV. UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A POSSIBLE EMETIC AFTER THE
OVERINDULGENCE

Unconscionability121as a general concept has its origins in
equity and has received lip service for centuries.122 Its acceptance

surety. Id. Because unenforceability on the basis of adhesion and violation of
public policy are matters for the court to decide as a matter of law, it was
appropriate for the court to refuse to consider a charge to the jury about a factual
finding as to these matters. Id. The provision was void as a matter of law, not
necessarily unconscionability alone, therefore no question of fact should have
been presented. Id.
121. Black's Law Dictionary offers a definition of"unconscionability" that is
divorced from the holdings of the various cases. It defines "unconscionability"
as "extreme unfairness." Black's Law Dictionary 1526 (7th ed. 1999). If
Black's Law Dictionary is given its due as an authority on the meaning of legal
terms as drawn from the primary sources of cases and statutes, then this
definition presents a telling irony. What better way to define a legal concept
that is overly broad than to use overly broad substitute words. This vague
definition shows not only how much room has been left for the courts to shape
and mold the concept, but also how effective the drafters of the UCC were in
accomplishing a shift from the pretextual to the explicit in the courts' reasoning.
122. An unconscionable contract is "such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other." Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411, 10 S. Ct.
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as a mainstream doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates
back only to its inclusion in the UCC. This is a short period of
time relative to the development of contract and is even shorter
when related to the length of time objectivity has been the test of
assent. 123 This very lack of history to guide us reinforces the need
for the analytical tool offered by this Article.
The Restatement Second of Contracts 124 followed the lead of
the Uniform Commercial Code' 25 and added a prohibition of
unconscionability. Neither the UCC nor the Restatement gives a
definition; at least not one which is not a self-reference. The
language of this section of the UCC is straightforward though
abstruse:
(1) [I]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid the
26
unconscionable result.'
The official comment to section 2-302 of the UCC states:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to
police explicitly against the contracts or causes which they
find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has
been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy
or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is
intended to allow the court to pass directly on the
unconscionability of the contract or particular clause
therein and to make
a conclusion of law as to its
27
unconscionability

Professor Llewellyn and the other drafters of the UCC had
transparent motives. They believed that it did more harm than
good for courts to subject contracts to various manipulations to
134 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28
Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Murray, supranote 12, § 96, at 551-53.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000).
U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
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achieve a result of fairness. An examination of the history of
unconscionability and an examination of recent cases which apply
the unconscionability doctrine reinforce the observation of the
drafters. The drafters believed an
28 explicit tool is better than a
covert or even manipulative tool. 1
Professor Arthur Leff is often credited with helping develop
the modem concept of unconscionability. It was he who began to
analyze the unconscionability doctrine in two facets:
(1)
procedural
unconscionability
and
(2)
substantive
unconscionability. 129 In examining the early formation of the
doctrine, Professor Leff pointed to one problem, also noted by
Professor Llewellyn, with the "adoption of the position that any
form contract was open to clause-by-clause policing."
That
128. Many authors have grappled with the idea of unconscionability. An
early commentator believed the main focus of the courts should be on the
relative bargaining power of the parties. See, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown, The
Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a
Relic, 105 Com. L.J. 287, 289 (2000); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967);
Comment: BargainingPower and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach to
UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 998, 999 (1966). One believes that a
clarification of the doctrine of unconscionability is needed and to do so would
not harm or overly restrict its application. In a recent article, one scholar argued
that the concept of unconscionability has become so outdated as to be an
unreliable concept for lawyers to use. Brown, supra,at 288-89. Evelyn Brown
suggested that because of its indefinable nature, unconscionability gives no
guidance to courts in its application; thus, we get inconsistent application and no
basis for making future claims. Id. at 291. Asifa Quraishi warns that "if the law
fails to develop a clear unconscionability test, then the fate of every contract will be
left to the unfettered discretion of each individual judge." Asifa Quraishi,
Comments-From a Gasp to a Gamble:A ProposedTest for Unconscionability,
25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 187, 203 (1991). Quraishi proposes that courts look to
"both the American and Islamic legal systems to improve the law of
unconscionability in each." Id. at 215. Quraishi states that courts should only
hold a contract unconscionable when "two elements are present: (1) one of the
contracting parties, through the contract, creates a potential for unearned profits
(in Islamic terminology) or unjust enrichment (in Western common law
terminology), especially through excessive speculation; and (2) the beneficiary
of the unearned profit occupies the stronger position in an oppressive
relationship between the contracting parties." Id. In justifying the test, Quraishi
applied it to the Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. decision by saying
that the first prong would be met because the contract went "beyond acceptable
market practices," and thus was excessively speculative, and the second prong
would be met as it was articulated by the Williams court. Id. at 222-23.
129. Leff, supranote 128, at 487.
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problem is, Llewellyn wrote, that "the use of form contracts is a
social good."' 130 He said that courts should look for something
greater than just the form contract when examinin procedural
unconscionability; they should look for adhesion.'
Leff also
referenced the need for courts to look at the difference between
132
merchant-to-merchant and merchant-to-consumer transactions.
He spoke of substantive unconscionability in terms of "imbalance"
and how such a term could be judged by a court.' 33

To him it

would have been better to have a "special merchant's jury" to
determine whether the provisions of a contract fit the
circumstances of a particular trade.' 34 In the end, Professor Leff
offered a glib, but accurate assessment of the impact of section 2302 on the sales sector: "The world is not going to come to an
end."135 So although he doubted the true effectiveness of section
2-302, he was quite sure it would
36 not bring the form contract and
its economy to a grinding halt.'
Several of the major treatises suggest that the literature and
courts' opinions focus on unconscionability as a product of two
strains:
procedural and substantive unfairness.' 3 7
Courts
emphasize the flexibility of the concept, but remain centered on the
concepts of unfairness in the bargaining process and unfairness in
the result reached by the bargaining parties.' 38 Professor Leff
suggested that oppression is substantive and quite distinct from
surprise, which is procedural, even though the comment to section
2-302 mentions both as an apparent monolith. 3 9 Even Leff, who
offered the two labels of substance and procedure, suggested they
come from different sources and serve different masters.
Despite some criticism of his conclusions, Leff's very readable

130. Id. at 504.
131. Id. at 507.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 510.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 558.
137. Perillo, supranote 10, § 9.37, at 381; Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 4.28,
at 311-12; Murray, supra note 12, § 96, at 556-58.
138. Murray, supranote 12, § 96, at 555.
139. The quote is: "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise (Cf Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948))
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power." U.C.C. § 2-302 official cmt. (2004).
140. Leff, supranote 128, at 487-88.
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article has been influential in setting the terminology. 14 1 Some
have echoed Leffts call to carefully tread on contract freedom, in
some cases using traditional libertarian concepts,143142 and in others
using less conventional, but interesting language.
141. Perrillo, supra note 10, § 9.37, at 381.
142. Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45
Iowa L. Rev. 843 (1960). This note stated that the code section could be applied
in three ways:
(1) 'unconscionability' could be narrowly restricted to its common-law
meaning as developed in actions at law; (2) 'unconscionability' might
be interpreted as embodying certain common-law doctrines which were
developed in other areas and have not yet had general application in the
law of sales; (3) the concept could be given broad application by which
contractual provisions could be stricken or modified if they would be
grossly unfair in the operation.
Id. The danger of the latter, the note warned, was that a liberal interpretation of
unconscionability would allow courts to make new contracts for parties. Id.
However, the author of the note also said that absolute freedom to contract
"carries the seeds of the destruction of the competitive economy which it is
supposed to foster." Id. at 844. Though the note did not focus on bargaining
power, it stated that "[flew contracts are negotiated wherein the parties are
perfectly equal in bargaining power." Id. The author of the note observed that
some cases involved such extreme inequalities of bargaining power such that
they were difficult to ignore. Id. The primary focus of the note, therefore, was
on the flexibility of UCC section 2-302 to meet any given set of facts and to
render unenforceable genuinely "unfair" contracts. Id. at 846. In the end, the
author said that "[t]he concept should develop beyond its restricted scope at
common law." Id. at 866. The note concluded by saying, "[t]he ultimate
configurations of unconscionability will depend on the evolution of workable
standards and a judicial intuition for knowing when one party has gone too far."
Id.
143. Phillip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513 (2003). Bridwell draws his
distinctions in the philosophical concepts of positive and negative freedom. Id.
at 1514-15. Phillip Bridwell says:
Negative freedom, in contrast to positive freedom, defines free choice
solely by reference to external factors rather than examining the
reasonableness of the choice. Under this concept of freedom, a court's
inquiry into whether the transaction was voluntary would be limited to
determinations of whether external factors improperly affected the
transaction.
Id. at 1515.
Bridwell posits that if courts would quit relying on positive freedom to analyze
unconscionable contracts and start using negative freedom, then the concept
would have a more definite scope of application and a clear line of cases would
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Leff's procedural and substantive terminology is adopted here
as well. There is a slight modification however. While the
terminology is of procedure and substance, one should consider
that this is also a different way of stating the older question of
subjective and objective view point in bargained-for exchanges.
Procedural unconscionability looks into the naughtiness of the
bargaining process itself and demands that we compare the results
with the intentions of the parties. Parties generally understand
what they are doing and have the ability to read and understand,
but what they lack is the motivation to ensure that their intention is
carried into the language of the deal. This is the source of the
tension between the objective and subjective divisions of
contracts. 144 If we truly believed in a pure, unadulterated,
objective theory of contract we would never inquire into whether
misunderstanding, duress, or fraud were involved in the
transaction. Iconoclastic views of the contract, whether objective

develop. Id. at 1529. He says that courts should do this for two reasons. Id.
"First, negative freedom allows clear precedent to develop by clearly defining
the relevant category of criteria by which a court should evaluate free choice.
Second, negative freedom limits courts' ability to decide cases based on intuitive
conceptions of fairness." Id. He further states:
Positive freedom encourages courts to engage in an ad hoc resolution of
cases because it advances a concept of the will that equates free choice
with reasonable choice. Negative freedom provides a better basis for
application of Section 2-302 because it limits courts' discretion in
applying the doctrine of unconscionability and therefore allows clear
precedent to develop.
Id. at 1531.
144. From objectivity's preeminence comes a complementary principle.
Genuine assent is not needed where there is apparent assent. Ricketts v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2nd Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring). Where
this leads is that the modem contract rests on an objective view that does not
take into account personal, unspoken, and unsignaled preferences. Outward
appearances count for much more than inward reflections and judgments.
Among the many qualities they share, adhesion and unconscionability can be
grouped together in this. Both express limits on the objective nature of
Unconscionability in bargaining, also called procedural
contracts.
unconscionability, addresses some of the same territory as adhesion. Id. What
appears to be a bargain is not because the process by which the questionable
bargain was arrived is so unfair as to be a sham. See U.C.C. § 2-303.
Objectivity represents laissez-faire policies carried as far as possible, while
adhesion, unconscionability, and the other interventionist doctrines represent the
activist side of the law.
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or subjective, lead to ridiculous extensions of the iconic value.
Some of that controversy can be assuaged by reinvigorating the
doctrine of adhesion and seeing it as a complementary and
coordinate part of the resistance to total objectivity. In carefully
considering the issue of formation, the jury and the judge will have
valuable roles in limiting abuse in both bargaining and substance.
These better articulated roles will in turn relieve some of the
controversy associated with the open-ended nature of the current
view of unconscionability.
V. UNCONSCIONABILITY AS ADMINISTERED BY THE COURTS

There have been efforts at elaboration and simplification.145 It
appears that most courts agree that elements of both procedural and
substantive wrongdoing must be present. 146 Courts have been
particularly reluctant to find unconscionability where there is only
procedural unconscionability without substantive unfairness as a
complement. 147 No matter the exact proportion sought and
48
accepted, Leffs analysis has great appeal in the court opinions.1
145. See Maxwell v. Fidelity FinancialServices, 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995),
for an example of a case that places an emphasis on efforts at elaboration. One
federal court has articulated seven elements that may be used in determining
unconscionability. Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th
Cir. 1986) (discussing Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991 (Colo. 1986)).
Among the elements suggested are the presence of standardized agreements, the
lack of an opportunity to read and become familiar with the document, the use
of fine print quality, whether the terms are substantially unfair and the
relationship of the parties, which might affect assent or lead to unfair surprise or
lack of notice. These attempts amount to a more elaborate articulation of the
two elements dealing with procedure and substance. They are helpful in urging
the court to look at all of the possibilities in both areas, but they do not contain
much new discussion.
146. Murray, supranote 12, § 96, at 557.
147. The Seventh Circuit has taken a much sterner approach to the
unconscionability doctrine. In Communications Maintenance v. Motorola, 761
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1985), the court found a lack of substantive unfairness and
therefore refused to find unconscionability.
See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
148. In defining unconscionability courts have divided it into two facets:
procedural and substantive. Procedural unconscionability has generally been
applied to the bargaining process, while substantive unconscionability has been
applied to the actual bargain.
In order to determine procedural
unconscionability, the Ninth Circuit stated that the court must examine the
bargaining process and the circumstances which surrounded the parties at that
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One of the landmark cases to discuss unconscionability was
CampbellSoup Co. v. Wentz. 149 Wentz entered into a contract with
Campbells which stated he was to sell his crop of Chantenay red
carrots grown on fifteen acres of land. 150 Wentz was to deliver the
carrots himself to the Campbell plant in Camden, New Jersey for a
price ranging from twenty-three to thirty dollars per ton depending
on the time of delivery.' 5 ' Wentz failed to deliver due to an
increase in the market price to over ninety dollars per ton and
Campbell sued to enforce the contract.' 52 The court pointed to
equity which does not allow the enforcement of unconscionable
contracts. 153 It decided that the contract was unconscionable on
the whole. 154 Among the clauses called into question was one
allowing Campbell to refuse carrots in excess of twelve tons per
acre, but not allowing Wentz to sell excess carrots without the
permission of Campbell. 155 5 The
court called this provision,
"carrying a good joke too far."' 6
It is interesting that the court considered traditional limitations
on objectivity, determining that the contract was neither illegal nor
the product of duress, but that "the sum total of its provisions
' 57
drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist."'
Thus, in this early case, pre-UCC, one that was offered as authority
for section 2-302, the traditional or manipulative doctrines were

time. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying California law). It further stated that "[a] contract is oppressive if an
inequality of bargaining power between the parties precludes the weaker party
from enjoying a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose the terms ofthe

contract." Id. The court went on to define substantive unconscionability as
whether the terms of the contract were "so one-sided as to shock the
conscience." Id. at 1172 (quoting Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs, Inc., 70
Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1329 (1999)). This determination was to be done in
analyzing the contract as of the time it was made. Id.
149. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949). It was of sufficient stature that the
commentators used it to justify the section on unconscionability added to the
UCC in the 1950s. See U.C.C. § 2-302 official cmt. (2004).
150. Campbell Soup Co., 172 F.2d at 81.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 83.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 84.
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tried before the court veered from them to make a substantive
review.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., another landmark
case, demonstrates the close connection between adhesiveness and
unconscionability. 158 In Williams, the court held unconscionable a
Williams, and other
contract for the sale of furniture.' 59
defendants, purchased several items from the plaintiff on
installment plans. 160 The contract stated that all payments made
would be applied on a pro rata basis to all outstanding accounts,
It also
leases, and bills the buyers had with Walker-Thomas.
stated that upon default, Walker-Thomas could repossess all items
with outstanding balances.' 62 The effect was that Williams would
never own any piece of furniture until all had been paid off. Upon
any default, seller could repossess everything ever sold to
Williams.
In reviewing the contract and noting that Williams had paid
$1,400 of $1,800 owed, the court stated they could not "condemn
too strongly appellee's conduct." 163 The court also noted that the
buyers had low income, were recipients of federal aid, and had
64
little choice within the market place to which they had access.'
The collection of circumstances-buyers' limited choice, their
difficulty reading the complex language, and the seller's
willingness to exploit-combined to make a person of little
education and knowledge enter into an unreasonable agreement. It
was the combination of harsh terms and the buyers' grossly
the contract
inferior
bargaining position that made
unconscionable. 165 In such a case, the court said the person
entering the contract was left with "no meaningful choice," and
should not have to suffer the consequences of irresponsible
business practices. 166 The amalgam of factors present in Williams
makes it more than just a landmark unconscionability case.' 67 It
158. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
159. Id. at 450.
160. Id. at 447.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 448 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914, 916 (D.C. 1964)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 449.
166. Id. at 450.
167. One author has argued that the Williams case has little lasting power. In
a recent comment, Eben Colby wrote that it has failed to become the "powerful
tool for the indigent... [to] guard against unfair surprise and oppression.., that
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adds much to the argument that unconscionability
can come
68
passably close to a pure adhesion situation.1
Substantive unfairness distinguishes unconscionability from
adhesion. Adhesion is defined by its take-it-or-leave-it approach,
while unconscionability depends upon a conscience shocked by the
ultimate result. The elements of procedure and substance offer
more of an opportunity to ask how the harshness came about than
they offer an elemental definition. An early, bold declaration of
unconscionability by the New Hampshire Supreme Court
illustrates this.
The court held that a large price discrepancy alone is enough to
satisfy an unconscionability claim.169
In American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, a creditor extended credit to
Maclver without disclosing all of the terms of the agreement.170 In

would help the common law become a leveling force in the field of form
contracts." Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrineof UnconscionabilityDo
to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 646-47
(2002). Ten years prior to the Williams case, thousands of people faced writs of
replevin from Walker-Thomas while, after the case, the company continued to
pursue people in default with just as much vigor and "the only change being that
the furniture company stopped using writs of replevin, and instead sued
customers for the balance of the contract." Id. at 657.
168. For instance, in Vitex Manufacturing Corp., Ltd. v. Caribtex Corp., the
Third Circuit found that even though a large price and cost differential were
present, the apparent equality in bargaining power between sophisticated parties
and the availability of other options meant the contract could not be found
unconscionable. 377 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1967). In Vitex, the Caribtex buyer
negotiated for the processing of cloth to allow for its duty-free import into the
United States. Id. at 797. The special relationship may allow the court to
manipulate the doctrine to achieve a result. One such case is Unico v. Owen,
232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). In Unico, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the
principle of UCC § 2-302 to waiver of defense clauses that are common as
boilerplate in provisions of negotiable instruments. Id.at 418. Owen executed a
promissory note with Universal Stereo which was eventually negotiated to
Unico. Id. at 406-07. Unico attempted to enforce the contract which Owen
claimed to have been lacking in consideration. Id. The court avoided the
harshness of the waiver clause by determining that Unico was not to be a holder
in due course because of its close connection to Universal Stereo. Id. at 413.
The court said the waiver clause was clearly unconscionable and enforcement
would be a violation ofpublic policy. Id. at 418.
169. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888
(N.H. 1964).
170. Id. at 886.
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159

reviewing the value of the goods it was found that their actual
value was only $959, thus creating a cost-value difference of
$1,609.60.171 Cases such as this are remarkable. 172 The court

of
made no apology for its forthright examination and review
73
alone.'
differential
price
the
on
based
fairness
substantive
In determining how the concept of unconscionability should
evolve, courts have taken claims on a case-by-case basis. This has
given attorneys much latitude to craft contracts and to redraft them
to cure shortfalls.' 74 Some courts appear to prefer the vague test
171. Id. at 888. Upon this revelation the court stated that "[i]nasmuch as the
defendants have received little or nothing of value and under the transaction they
entered into they were paying $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less,
the contract should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features." Id.
at 889.
172. One commentator explored this question of pure price unconscionability
and asked, "Should a contract be declared unconscionable on substantive
grounds alone?" Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive
Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. Rev.
940, 943 (1986). In asking this question, Craig Horowitz proposed that courts
should use tort principles in enforcing the good faith and fair dealing concept.
Id. at 944. In examining consumer credit cases, Horowitz said simply using
unconscionability is insufficient and the court should apply the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 964.
173. In New York, a court has held a contract unconscionable under section
2-302 of the UCC because, among other things, salesmen defrauded consumers
and charged excessive prices. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 53 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966). The court never crafted or cited a test to be enforced under UCC
section 2-302 other than to directly quote section 2-302 and say that "[n]o longer
do we believe that fraud may be prepetrated [sic] by the cry of caveat emptor."
Id. at 54.
In FrostifreshCorp. v. Reynoso, a Spanish-speaking couple signed a contract
that was written entirely in English and was filled with hidden charges and
penalty clauses. 52 Misc. 2d 26 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966). There, the defendant,
Reynoso, purchased a refrigerator that had cost Frostifresh $348 for the price of
$900 plus $245.88 in credit charges, late charges, and attorney's fees. Id. at 26.
After paying one installment of $32, Reynoso defaulted. Id. The court, noting
"the principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise,"
refused to enforce the contract saying it was "too hard a bargain." Id. at 28.
174. One court called unconscionability "an amorphous concept obviously
designed to establish a broad business ethic." Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d 907,
911 (2004) (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543, 279 A.2d 640 (1971)).
The court would further state that the conduct implied in such a business ethic is
a lack of "good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing." Id.
Another court has said that a contract will only be held to be unconscionable
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over the specific for reasons of convenience or perhaps
flexibility.17 5 Others seem reluctant because of a need to express
moral or value judgments which are not amenable to elements and
specifics. 176 What they share is a willingness to ask about

"when it is so unfair, one-sided, and oppressive that it violates all notions of fair
play and justice." SI Communications, Inc. v. Nielsen Media Research, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 404, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Mistry Prabhudas Manji Eng'g
Pvt., Ltd. v. Raytheon Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26-27
(D. Mass. 2002).
175. Some courts do not use a specific test; rather they simply look at a series
of factors in order to determine what constitutes unconscionability. Sehulster
Turmels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Bros., Inc./Obayashi Corp., 111 Cal. App. 4th 1328,
1340, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 665 (2003). A California court has gone so far as to
say that the first element of an unconscionable contract is adhesion. Id. The
second element requires the party seeking to avoid enforcement to "establish
that a given term is so harsh and one-sided that it 'shock[s] the conscience."' Id.
(quoting Brutoco Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 4th
1326, 1331, 171 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (2003)). The state of New York has stated
that if a contract is found unconscionable under UCC section 2-302 the court has
"the power to refuse to enforce such an unconscionable contract or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result." Pearson v. Nat'l Budgeting Sys., Inc., 297 N.Y.S.2d 59,
60 (App. Div. 1969). This is essentially the same treatment received under all
common law and section 2-302 unconscionability claims. Another California
court stated that "[a]nalysis of unconscionability begins with an inquiry into
whether the contract was a contract of adhesion," and, "[a] finding of adhesion
is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability." Flores v. Transamerica
Homefirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853, 113 Cal Rptr. 2d 376 (2001).
176. In attempting to define such an abstract concept courts have tended to
lean more upon their moral values than true contract theory. One court defined
an unconscionable contract as "one abhorrent to good morals and conscience."
Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538 S.E.2d 73, 80 (Ga. App. 2000) (quoting
F.N. Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 208 S.E.2d 13, 16 (Ga. App.
1974)). "It is one where one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of
another." Id. Still other courts have appealed more to the inequality of
bargaining power in saying that unconscionability is "an inequality so strong,
gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with common
sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it." Smith v.
Kriska, 113 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (citing State, Missouri Dep't
of Soc. Servs., Div. of Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 273,
277 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)). This court would further state "an unconscionable
contract is one 'such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make, on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
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procedure and substance, but in the end, make a judgment about
fundamental fairness without the predicate of bargain failure which
is central to adhesion. Unconscionability begins and ends with the
conscience.
178
17 7
AND CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES
VI. APPLICATION: ARMENDARIZ

IllustrationSeven
Amanda, a well-educated worker with some experience in
the health care industry applied for a job at Wellsprings, a
good-sized company specializing in referrals from health
maintenance organizations and group plan insurers. The local
and state economies are in a recession. Jobs are tight and there
are several applicants for the single position. The application
form contains the usual information-gathering questions and
also a description of the job and a provision concerning
arbitration as the only method for resolving any claim of
wrongful termination. 1 9 Amanda is selected as the successful
Salary and benefits are
candidate after her interview.
established and among the terms of the multi-page agreement
is the same clause on arbitration. Amanda signs the agreement
and later complains she was uncertain of its meaning,
considered it unimportant given her need for the job, and that it
is unfair as a limitation of only her rights.
80
A. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc.'

Marybeth Armendariz (Armendariz) and a co-plaintiff were
18 1
employees of Foundation Health Psychare, Inc. (Foundation).
Armendariz served the Foundation as a low-level supervisor; she
had been employed for about a year before her position was

other."' Id.(quoting Liberty Fin. Mgmt. v. Beneficial Data, 670 S.W.2d 40, 49
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984)). In molding a test for unconscionability courts have
struggled in determining how to look for something they cannot truly define.
See note 174 and accompanying text.
177. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6
P.3d 669 (2000).
178. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
179. The full provision is reproduced infra note 188.
180. 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669.
181. Id.at9l,6P.3dat674.

162

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

eliminated. 182 During her employment, Armendariz alleged that
she received numerous, uninvited sexual advances from fellow
employees and supervisors and183that she was discriminated against
because of her heterosexuality.
Armendariz's allegations included violations of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). 184 She sought to
maintain the court action despite a mandatory arbitration clause
that appeared twice in her hiring paperwork. 185 The first was in the
application of employment filled out by Armendariz prior to her
hire.' 86 The second was in the employment agreement written by
the Foundation and signed by Armendariz. 187 She alleged that the
arbitration clause was unenforceable because it required her to
but left the Foundation
arbitrate any wrongful termination claim,
88
free to litigate any claim against her.'
182. Id., 6 P.3d at 674-75.
183. Id. There is no evidence in the record that Armendariz was specifically
targeted because she was a heterosexual. It seems more likely that her sexual
orientation was included to trigger the provisions of the California Fair Housing
and Employment Act (FEHA), California Government Code § 12900. This is
more plausible since the California Supreme Court has ruled that same-sex
harassment and discrimination is unlawful under the FEHA. Id. at 92, 6 P.3d at
675 n. 1 (citing Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 116 (1993)).
184. California Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code
§ 12900.
185. Annendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669.
186. Id. at 91, 6 P.3d at 675.
187. Id. at 91-92, 6 P.3d at 675.
188. Id. The arbitration clause, in relevant part, is as follows:
I agree as a condition of my employment, that in the event my
employment is terminated, and I contend that such termination was
wrongful or otherwise in violation of the conditions of employment or
was in violation of any express or implied condition, term or covenant
of employment, whether founded in fact or in law, including but not
limited to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or otherwise in
violation of any of my rights, I and Employer agree to submit any such
matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of title 9 of Part
III of the California Code of Civil Procedure, commencing at section
1280 et seq. or any successor or replacement statutes. I and Employer
further expressly agree that in any such arbitration, my exclusive
remedies for violation of the terms, conditions of covenants or
employment shall be limited to a sum equal to the wages I would have
earned from the date of any discharge until the date of the arbitration
award. I understand that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at
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The trial court held that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable as a matter of law.' 89 Rejecting Foundation's
argument that any unconscionable provision should be severed and
the rest of the agreement enforced, the trial court invalidated the
entire agreement. 190 The California Court of Appeals, however,
disagreed with the trial court; it held that the specific provision
concerning the limitation of damages was unconscionable, 19 ' but
the rest of the agreement could survive if the offending provisions

law or in equity, including but not limited to reinstatement and/or
injunctive relief
Id. As a statistical aside, the author submitted this provision to the readability
system included in Corel © WordPerfect 12 ©, which utilizes the FleschKincaid method for determining readability. That system calculated that this
provision was written at a sixteenth grade level (high school education plus a
baccalaureate degree); the sentence complexity was scaled at eighty-one out of a
possible 100; and the word complexity was scaled at fifty-seven out of 100. For
comparison, the instructions for the 2003 1040EZ form was rated at a 10.5 grade
level; sentence complexity of twenty-seven; and a word complexity of fortytwo. For a general discussion of the statistical reliability of readability tests
generally, see William H. DuBay, The Principles of Readability, available at
http://www.impact-information.com/impactinfo/readability02.pdf (unpublished
working paper) (last visited March 8, 2005).
189. Arnendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 92, 6 P.3d at 675. All discussion of
Armendariz's statutory claims and the court's holdings about whether an
individual may indeed arbitrate these statutory rights has been omitted. For a
detailed discussion of that portion of the opinion, see 24 Cal. 4th at 93-113, 6
P.3d at 676-89. To summarize, the California Supreme Court held that one can
indeed arbitrate non-waivable statutory rights under the FEHA so long as the
arbitration adheres to certain minimum "fairness" requirements: "(1) provides
for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3)
requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would
otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access
to the arbitration forum." 24 Cal 4th at 102, 6 P.3d 682 (quoting Cole v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., in the context of Title VII claims)). The
California Supreme Court also discussed the similarities and differences
between the Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act (Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. § 1280) as an integral part of this analysis. See 24 Cal. 4th at
96-100, 6 P.3d at 678-81.
190. Arnendariz,24 Cal. 4th at 92-93, 6 P.3d at 675.
191. Id.
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were stricken. 192 This was the issue taken to the California
Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court applied a two-prong analysis to
determine
whether
the
arbitration
agreement
was
First, the court considered whether the
unconscionable. 193
arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion.194
The
California definition of the term is, "a standardized contract,
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing 9arty only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it."
Second, if the contract is
adhesive, the court considers whether (1) the contract or the
particular provision does not "fall within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker

. . .

party"' 96 and (2) the contract or

provision, even if consistent with the weaker party's expectation, is
on the whole "oppressive or 'unconscionable."" ' 197 If either factor
is present, then a court can, under established rules of law, elect
not to enforce the ap 9eement.198 This begs the question, "What is
unconscionability?"
192. Id.
193. Id. at 113, 6 P.3d at 689. The trial court applied this same two-prong
analysis in its determination. The analysis is derived from Graham v. ScissorTail,Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807 (1981).
194. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113, 6 P.3d at 689.
195. Id. (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694
(1961)).
196. Id.
197. Id.(quoting Neal, 188 Cal. App. 2d at 694). Interestingly, the
California Supreme Court, to this point, has failed to offer a workable definition
of the term "unconscionable." Moreover, note the language, "'reasonable
expectations' of the weaker party" the court uses. Id.
198. Id. The court goes to some length to stress the notion that its rule
announced here, and earlier, is not capricious. The next paragraph of the
opinion is devoted to setting out the California Legislature's unconscionability
principle. The legislature has codified, "Ifthe court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result." Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a).
199. Although not stated explicitly in the brief, the court made the required
bridge between contracts generally and arbitration agreements. First, it held that
the CAA provides that courts do not have to enforce arbitration agreements
when "such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract" are present. 24
Cal. 4th at 114 (quoting Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281). Additionally, the court
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The court defined unconscionability as two distinct, but related,
concepts: (a) procedural unconscionability and (b) substantive
unconscionability. 20 0 Procedural unconscionability focuses on
"oppression" or "surprise" arising from the unequal bargaining
power of the parties, while substantive unconscionability focuses
on "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results. 20 1 To prevail, the
aggrieved must show that both factors are present in some
inversely proportional degree. 202
The bulk of the court's opinion was a careful application of the
2 3
two-prong analysis to the Armendariz-Foundation agreement. 0
While the court appeared eager to invalidate the arbitration
provision, it seemed to curb its enthusiasm in order to avoid the
criticism that the court was singling out arbitration agreements for
disparate treatment as a suspect class. 20 4 The court moved very
carefully toward its goal, relying on well-beaten
20 5 paths in
precedent, legislative authority, and traditional equity.
To begin, the court considered whether the arbitration
'9
2 °6
agreement was adhesive. "There is little doubt that it is.

noted a United States Supreme Court decision to a similar effect. See Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996).
200. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114, 6 P.3d at 690.
201. Id.Seemingly, their meaning is common knowledge such that further
It is curious, though, that substantive
explanation is not necessary.
unconscionability is defined in terms of results since there can be an
unconscionable agreement in substance that fails to produce "overly harsh" or
"one-sided" results. Consider, however, that the court stated, "[e]ssentially a
sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process
of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater
Id.
harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves."
(quoting 15 Williston on Contracts § 1763A, at 226-27 (3d ed. 1972)) (emphasis
added).
202. Id. When, for example, there is ample evidence of procedural
unconscionability, a correspondingly smaller amount of substantive
unconscionability is necessary and vice versa. Id.
203. Id at 115-22, 6 P.3d at 690-96.
204. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot invalidate
arbitration agreements based on state law applicable only to arbitration
provisions. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652
(1996). The California court contrasted its view with that of an Alabama case,
which "flies in the face" of Doctor's Associates. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at
119, 6 P.3d at 693.
205. Id at l15-19,6P.3dat690-94.
206. Id.at 114-15,6P.3d at 690.
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Noting the economic pressure exerted on an individual who does
not usually have the luxury of shopping for employment without
an arbitration requirement and the inherent, potential downside of
arbitration,2 °7 the court reached this conclusion easily. While
arbitration is encouraged as a matter of California policy, it is not
to be used as a leverage device by an employer; and when it
appears to a court that arbitration is being
abused, a court should
2
step in and return fairness to the system. 0r
The court then turned to Armendariz's allegation that the
arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because of
its "lack of mutuality." 20 9 Armendariz relied primarily on an
earlier California Court of Appeals opinion, Stirlen v. Supercuts,
Inc., in which a chief financial officer's employment agreement
was held unconscionable because of a clause that required him to
arbitrate claims arising from his termination. 210 In Stirlen, the
employer specifically excluded some circumstances, such as its
protection of trade secrets, etc., 2 11 and the clause also limited the
amount of damages available to the employee.212 Despite the
employee's high-level status, the court of appeals concluded the
contract was adhesive because of a lack of bargaining
opportunity. 213 Considering the lack of the employer's obligation
and the limitation of damages, the court of appeals concluded that
207. See Farnsworth, supra note 12. Some of the downsides of arbitration
include waiver of a trial by jury, limited discovery, and limited judicial review;
the upsides are efficiency, informality, and lower cost. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th
at 115, 6 P.3d at 690.
208. Id., 6 P.3d at 690-91 (quoting Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
15 Cal. 4th 951, 989, 938 P.2d 903, 927 (1997) (Kenard, J., concurring)).
209. Id. at 115-16, 6 P.3d at 690-91. The court makes no mention of the
procedural unconscionability in the arbitration agreement. Clearly, this is to be
inferred from the adhesive nature of the contract. What is puzzling is that the
two-prong analysis starts with a determination of adhesion and then moves to
unconscionability, parsed into the procedural and substantive. Thus, it seems
like the first prong informs or overlaps the procedural element of
unconscionability required in the second prong. If this is true, then either the
court will sustain an action whenever a contract of adhesion is substantively
unconscionable (unlikely and in fact disclaimed in the opinion) or the court
announced a superfluous (or confusing) test.
210. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138
(1997).
211. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 116, 6 P.3d at 691 (citing Stirlen, 51 Cal.
App. 4th at 1528, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142).
212. Id.(citing Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1529, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143).
213. Id.(citing Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1541, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151).
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the agreement was substantively 214
unconscionable because it lacked
even a "modicum of bilaterality."
Not every agreement must produce symmetrical results. But,
asymmetrical results require some objective, legitimate business
need over and above an employer's desire to have a friendly
forum. 215 The court also cited Kinney v. United HealthCare
Services, Inc.,216 which held that a unilateral arbitration agreement
between an employer and an employee was substantively
unconscionable for lack of mutuality. Consequently, since there
was no objective, legitimate business need on which Foundation
could justify the lack of mutuality, the court concluded that the
arbitration agreement (like the ones in Stirlen and Kinney) was
217
substantively unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.
While this conclusion is apparent from precedent, the court was
very careful to dispel any notion that it singled out arbitration
agreements as a suspect class; this justification
occupied a fair
21 8
amount of the court's subsequent opinion.
To counter, Foundation cited cases where the "lack of
mutuality" did not render an arbitration agreement illusory since
214. Id.
215. Id.at 117. Interestingly, the Stirlen court noted that the terms of the
arbitration clause were outrageous enough "as to appear unconscionable
according to the mores and business practices of the time and place." 51 Cal.
App. 4th at 1542, 60 Cal. Rpter 2d at 152 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
216. 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1999). The Kinney court
was particularly harsh to arbitration and may have crossed some line. The
Kinney court, for example, noted, "Faced with the issue of whether a unilateral
obligation to arbitrate is unconscionable, we conclude that it is. The party who
is required to submit his or her claims to arbitration forgoes the right... to have
those claims tried before a jury. Further, except in extraordinary circumstances,
that party has no avenue of review for an adverse decision, even if that decision
is based on an error of fact or law .... " Id.at 1332, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355,
quoted in Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 117, 6 P.3d at 692. The Armendariz court
appeared to be working hard to retrench, terming these disadvantages as possible
ones. 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 668.
217. Id at 118,6P.3dat692.
218. See id. at 118-21, 9 P.3d at 693-95. The discussion of the Alabama
case, Ex Party McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1998), is confusing,
especially since the Armendariz court cites the prior Alabama case Northcom,
Ltd. v. James, 694 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. 1997), intermittently. It appears that the
California court wants to avoid singling out arbitration as a suspect class and
discourages this as an interpretation of their position by using the Alabama cases
as a "contra positive."
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the employers bound themselves to the determination of the
arbitrator. 2 ' 9 The court found these to be inapplicable since those
cases, and the thrust of Foundation's argument, used "lack of
mutuality" as a proxy for "lack of consideration," in the classical
contract formation sense.220
In holding this arbitration agreement
substantively
unconscionable, the court considered only this agreement, and did
not pass judgment on arbitration generally. 22 1 The essence of the
holding was simply that an arbitration agreement that lacks, say,
mutuality, is substantively unconscionable unless the lack of
mutuality is justified with an objective, legitimate business need.222
"It does not disfavor arbitration to hold that an employer may not
impose a system of arbitration on an employee that seeks to
maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of
arbitration for itself at the employee's expense." 223 Moreover, the
court offered in dictum that not all claims between an employer
and an employee must be arbitrated for the agreement to be
enforced. Instead, when the parties "agree" that one class of
dispute shall22be
4 sent to arbitration, both parties must submit to that

jurisdiction.

In the final part of the opinion, the court considered whether
the unconscionable provisions of the arbitration agreement could
be separated from the rest allowing the other terms to be saved.2 2 5
To aid its determination the court analogized it to separating illegal
provisions from a contract and enforcing the rest of the
agreement. 22 6 The court, however, offered
two reasons why
severance was impractical in this situation. 22 7 First, there were
219. Id.at 118, 6 P.3d at 692. It seems that Foundation incorrectly used the
traditional definition of "lack of mutuality" as being a harbinger for lack of
consideration. The court dispelled this notion. Id.
220. Id.at 119, 6 P.3d at 693.
221. Id. at 121,6P.3dat694.
222. Id.
223. Id.at 120, 6 P.3d at 693.
224. Id., 6 P.3d at 694. Quotations are the author's, supplied for lack of a
better word since the parties do not agree, by definition, in the classical sense to
a contract of adhesion.
225. See generallyid.at 121-27, 6 P.3d at 695-99.
226. Id.at 122, 6 P.3d at 695.
227. Id.at 124-25, 6 P.3d at 696-97. In instances where the court could first
find the original purpose or subject of the agreement and effectively separate the
illegal (or unconscionable) portions from the rest, California courts have opted
for severance. Cf Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 38 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Cal.
1964) (allowed severance because the value of the illegal machines could be
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numerous provisions that were unconscionable. 228 Removing one
provision alone would not have cured the unconscionability
present in the agreement. Second, the lack of mutuality permeated
the agreement to such an extent that the court could not identify
one single provision to strike for the cure. 229 Consequently, the
court would have been required to rewrite the entire agreement in
order to provide some mutuality in the arbitration agreement.23 °
The court demurred, stressing that courts do not have "any such
power under their inherent limited authority to reform
contracts." 23' The court noted that there was also justice in this
refusal.23 2 The court's denial of reformation may have been the
rejection of a token concession offered only after the employer's
failed attempt impose the one-sided bargain.
233
B. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute

The Shutes bought cruise tickets through a travel agent in
Arlington, Washington. 234 The cruise was aboard the Tropicale,
sailing from Los Angeles. The Tropicale sailed from Los Angeles
to the waters of Mexico and returned to Los Angeles seven days

determined and the illegal consideration could be identified and effectively
excluded); Werner v. Knoll, 89 Cal. App. 2d. 474, 476-77, 201 P.2d 45 (Cal.
1948) (holding that the valid portion of an exculpatory clause in a lease
agreement should be enforced, absent the illegal portions). However, when the
sole object or inducement of the agreement is illegal and permeates the
agreement to the degree that the illegal and the legal cannot be separated, the
court should void the entire agreement. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 123, 6 P.3d
at 696; see, e.g., Teachout v. Bogy, 175 Cal. 481, 166 P. 319 (Cal. 1917) (court
voided a lease purchase agreement because a provision about the transfer of a
liquor license was an integral part of the agreement and illegal).
228. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 124, 6 P.3d at 696-97. Among these were
the lack of mutuality and the limitation of damages. The court invalidated the
agreement based on the lack of mutuality idea, not even considering whether the
limitation on damages alone would suffice. Id., 6 P.3d at 696 n.13.
229. Id.at 124-25, 6 P.3d 696-97.
230. Id.at 125, 6 P.3d 697.
231. Id.(citing Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257,
260 (1998)) ("[The] power to reform [is] limited to instances in which parties
make mistakes, not to correct illegal provision.")
232. See id.at 125-27, 6 P.3d at 697-98.
233. 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991).
234. Id.at 587, 111 S.Ct.at 1524.
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235

While on board Eulala was given a tour of the shio'S
later.
galley where she tripped over a floor mat and was injured.
When the Shutes returned to Washington they sued Carnival in the
federal court for the Western District of Washington. Their claim
was negligence. 237 Carnival moved for summary judgment on the
basis that the tickets contained a forum-selection238clause and that
clause required that the suit be brought in Florida.
This was not your ordinary contracts case. The United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to address the question
of whether the forum-selection clause signed by the Shutes was
enforceable and constitutional. 239 The Court wrote:
We granted certiorari to address the question whether the
Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the District
Court should hear respondents' tort claim against
petitioner. Because we find the forum-selection clause to
be dispositive of this question, we need not consider
petitioner's constitutional argument as to personal
jurisdiction. We begin by noting the boundaries or our
inquiry. First, this is a case in admiralty, and federal law
enforceability of the forum-selection clause we
governs the
24 0
scrutinize.
So began, and ended, the Court's discussion of the minimum
contacts issue. Although not much more than a jumping-off point,
it provided a boundary to the Court's discussion of forum-

235. Id. at 588, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. In the alternative they sought dismissal on the basis of lack of
sufficient contacts to permit personal jurisdiction to be asserted by the
Washington courts over the cruise line. Id. The district court dismissed on this
alternative basis of a lack of minimum contacts. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed reasoning that "but for" Carnival's solicitation of business
through independent travel agents there would have been no cruise for Mrs.
Shute and no injury. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 1524-25. This is significant. The court
of appeals and the parties treated this matter as one in which the issue was the
presence or absence of personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts
sufficient to allow the jurisdiction consistent with principles of due process. In
other words it was not the central issue nor was it of much concern that the
contract specified a forum.
239. Id. at 589, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
240. Id. at 589-90, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
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selection. 24 1 While the issue of enforceability was said to raise
federal procedure questions rather than principles of contract law,
the Court never stated how common law contract analysis should
differ. 242 As the Court also pointed out, CarnivalCruiseLines was
an admiralty case. Because the suit was brought in admiralty, it
invoked princiPles
of federal admiralty law, rather than the
24
common law.

Much of the attention of the Court and the parties focused on
admiralty law and particularly the opinion in Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.244
In Bremen, a forum clause between two
corporations doing business internationally was attacked by the
American company. 245 Zapata, the American company, sued
Unterweser, a German company, in federal court in Florida over
the performance of an ocean-going tow contract. 246 The drilling
rig was damaged by a storm while under tow by a ship in the Gulf
of Mexico.247 It was then towed to Tampa, Florida
on the orders of
24 8
Zapata and suit was brought there by Zapata.
The United States District Court in Florida refused to dismiss
the action and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. 24 9 As a
matter of contract law, the dispute was quite narrow. There was no
issue of offer and acceptance, formation, and likewise no
controversy over the consideration offered and accepted. While
the quality of performance was at the heart of the dispute, the
Bremen decision was about the contractual limits of setting the site

241. Id. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was eight and one-half pages. Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 863 F.2d 1437, 1439-48 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 499 U.S.
585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). Seven and one-half pages dealt with the due
process issue of minimum contacts. Id. at 1439-47. Less than one full page
covered the effect of the forum-selection clause. Id. at 1447-48. The space in
the Supreme Court's majority opinion devoted to the issue of due process,
minimum contacts, was less than a full paragraph. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499
U.S. at 589-90, 111 S. Ct. at 1525. Seven pages addressed the validity of the
forum-selection clause. Id. at 589-97, 111 S. Ct. at 1525-29.
242. Id.
243. Id.at 590, 111 S.Ct. 1525.
244. 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972).
245. CarnivalCruiseLines, 499 U.S. at 591, 111 S. Ct. at 1526.
246. Id.

247. Id.
248. Id. The district court denied Unterweser's motion to dismiss based on
the forum-selection clause which called for resolution of disputes in the London
Court of Justice. Id.
249. Id.
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for the resolution of the substantive dispute over quality.250 Thus,
Bremen presented a relatively clean-cut discussion of the validity
of a forum-selection clause negotiated in an admiralty context in
which the parties then diverged over the power of that clause. The
Bremen Court noted that "a freely negotiated private international
agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power, such as that involved here, should be given full
effect." 25 This represented a substantial shift. No longer would
forum-selection clauses be disfavored for the sole reason that they
denied a court jurisdiction. Instead, they would be enforced unless
"enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable'
under the circumstances. 252 Absent "some compelling and
countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and
enforced by the courts" as it was the choice of experienced and
sophisticated businessmen dealing at arm's length.253
How sophisticated bargaining equates with reasonableness was
not made clear; but, it is apparent that the equation (free bargaining
by sophisticated and experienced business people =
reasonableness) was made, 254 and that equation was carried over to
Carnival.255 While the Court did not offer a complete definition of
reasonableness, it did emphasize several factors in its reversal of
the lower
courts and its enforcement of the forum-selection
2 56
clause.

The Supreme Court refused to adopt the court of appeal's
determination that the Shute-Carnival Cruise Line clause was
unenforceable under the holding in Bremen. The Court began by
explaining the cruise line's special interest in including a forumselection clause in the contract. That interest was to establish
Florida as the forum to prevent hundreds of passengers from suing
in multiple jurisdictions over a catastrophic incident at sea. The
Court also offered a neutral reason arguing that limiting the forum
to Florida reduced cost for both parties, providing certainty as to

250. Id. at 591-95, 111 S. Ct. at 1526-28.
251. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 92 S. Ct. 1907,
1915-16 (1972).
252. Id. at 10, 92 S. Ct. at 1913.
253. Id. at 12, 92 S. Ct. at 1914.
254. Id. at 10-12, 92 S. Ct. at 1913-14.
255. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591, 111 S. Ct.
1522, 1526 (1991).
256. Id.
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where the lawsuit would be broukht.257 And last, the Court offered
a rationale of passenger benefit.n
The Court then discussed the reasonableness of the forum
selection clause in the context of this commercial setting. The
Court noted the likelihood that a forum-selection clause would
reduce prices. It also noted the overwhelming burden for the
cruise line to defend suits in a multitude of jurisdictions. 259 The
majority wrote, "[F]inally, it stands to reason that passengers who
purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this
case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that
the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be
sued. 26 ° In other words, the Court appeared sanguine about the
enforcement of a clause that was not bargained for and perhaps not
even known by the passengers
because of the likelihood that it
26
would produce savings. '
Much of CarnivalCruiseLines can be explained as a too-quick
conclusion about reasonableness. In part this is understandable
257. Id.at 593-94, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
258. The Court asserted that the forum-selection clause reduced fares by
reflecting the savings that the cruise line would enjoy by limiting the forum to
Florida. Id.at 594, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. The Supreme Court did not take the
position that forum-selection clauses are not subject to the usual review for
fairness. Instead, it concluded that this clause was not the product of bad faith
and was fair. Id.at 595, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. In addition, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's finding that the Shutes were financially and physically incapable
of pursuing their case in Florida. Id. at 594, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. In what can
only be called a remonstrative slap at the lower court, Justice Blackmun wrote,
"the Court of Appeals' conclusory reference to the record provides no basis for
this Court to validate the finding of inconvenience. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals did not place in proper context this Court's statement in Bremen that
'the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties
might carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum
clause."' Id. On the positive side of the ledger the Court offered the economic
function of lowering costs and the apparent good faith of the cruise line in
limiting plaintiffs to the Florida forum. Id.at 593-95, 111 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
259. Id.at 593-94, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
260. Id.at 594, 111 S.Ct. at 1527.
261. Id. This economic claim is controversial.
Setting aside this
controversial claim for the moment, the Court does not resolve the fundamental
issue of whether a contract provision can be deemed to be reasonable if it is not
the product of any bargaining whatsoever. Here is where the Court's opinion is
weakest in its analysis. What the Court does not do is a standard contract
analysis of adhesion or unconscionability. It is not as if the Supreme Court did
not have other models from past decisions in which determination was made
about adhesion or unconscionability.
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because of the coincidence in language of "reasonableness" in
forum-selection clause analysis and the reasonableness so
dominant in objective contract doctrine. Caught up in the forum
selection analysis, the Court forgot the fundamental proposition
that underlies Bremen. In Bremen there was a freely negotiated
private agreement "unaffected by . . . overweening bargaining

power. ' 262 Not so in Carnival. The failure was the failure to
search for the presence of adhesiveness, of overweening
bargaining power, and it was clearly present in abundance.
What was different in Carnivalwas the quality of the Shutes'
assent. The forum-selection clause was imposed on the Shutes and
therefore was neither fair nor reasonable under the standards of
Bremen. That is not to say that in a proper case a similar forumselection clause could not be negotiated freely and be reasonable
and fair. To accomplish this, the Court needed to ask about the
parties' bargaining power. Instead it asked about the substance of
forum-selection clauses in general, thereby conflating substantive
Bremen did not suggest this
fairness with reasonableness.
conflation which creates something akin to a test of
Bremen asked about the nature of the
unconscionability.
bargaining, suggesting a conflation more akin to adhesion and
The distinction between substance and procedure,
fairness.
between classic adhesion and the nouveau unconscionability
analyses, is not given its due in Carnival. Parse the opinion in
search of a recognition of both doctrines and the lack of reflection
becomes apparent. What Carnival demonstrates is years of
indifferent differentiation by the courts. Here is what the Court
said in its closest approach to the issue:
In contrast, respondents' passage contract was purely
routine and was nearly identical to every commercial
passage contract issued by petitioner and most other cruise
lines. In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for
us to assume that respondents-or any other cruise
passenger-would negotiate with petitioner the terms of a
forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise
ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will
be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to
negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket
will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line. But by
ignoring the crucial differences in the business contexts in
which the respective contracts were executed, the Court of
262. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. 1, 12, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1914
(1972).
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to have distorted somewhat
Appeals' analysis seems to us 263
this Court's holding in Bremen.
Here is a missed opportunity to recognize the influence
adhesion should have in this test of reasonableness. For this reason
the Ninth Circuit actually did a better job of addressing the
apparent bargain by the Shutes with Carnival Cruise Lines. 264 That
court came to a quite different conclusion about its contractual
The circuit court noted the Shutes' claim of
effect.
unreasonableness based on the parties' disparity in bargaining
power. The disparity had an unreasonable impact on their ability
to pursue the case on its merits. 265 The Ninth Circuit properly set
the stage by reference to Bremen's test of contract validity saying
that a forum-selection clause should not be set aside unless the
party challenging it could clearly show its enforcement was
unreasonable and unjust. 2 66 The court went on to say that even if
the Shutes had notice of the provision, which they did not concede,
that there was nothing in the record to suggested that the Shutes
could have bargained over this language. The Ninth Circuit
presumed the bargain to be adhesive and then inquired as to the
presence of other factors to balance out the lack of bargaining and
make the forum-selection clause reasonable. It found none.
The gist of the Court's opinion is that it was a reasonable
bargain because the clause was a good faith economic measure
with a goal of shared savings. 2 67 The Court chided the Ninth
Circuit for its lack of evidence as to unreasonableness. 268 Yet it
was the Supreme Court that did not consider the clause in its full
context. It was the Supreme Court that did not carefully examine
all of the provisions and did not consider the implication of a
nonrefundable ticket that contains terms available to the Shutes
only after they had paid. A more careful examination of the ticket
would not have suggested neutral or positive cost-sharing

263. Carnival,499 U.S. at 593, 111 S. Ct. at 1527 (citations omitted).
264. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
265. Id. at 388.
266. The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused on the actual appearance of
bargaining between the parties. The court noted, "First, there is no evidence that
the provision was freely bargained for. To the contrary, the provision is printed
on the ticket, and presented to the purchaser on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Id.
267. Carnival,499 U.S. at 593-95, 111 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
268. Id. at 594, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
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Such an examination would have demonstrated bad

1. So Who Reads the BoilerplateAnyway?
Even more damaging to the Supreme Court's position is the
lack of support for its conclusion that the clause was offered in
good faith. The quote from the Court is:
In this case, there is no indication that petitioner set Florida
as the forum in which disputes were to be resolved as a
means of discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing
legitimate claims. Any suggestion of such a bad-faith
motive is belied by two facts: Petitioner has its principal
place of business in Florida, and many of its cruises depart
from and return to Florida ports. Similarly, there is no
evidence that petitioner obtained respondents' accession to
the forum clause by fraud overreaching.
Finally,
respondents have conceded that they were given notice of
the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the
option of rejecting the contract with impunity.770
This conclusion of good faith by the Court is astonishing.
Carnival had attempted to fully exculpate itself from liability in
another paragraph on the same page of the ticket. This attempt at
full exculpation was not even mentioned in the majority opinion.
269. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd,499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). As the Ninth Circuit notes the test
according to Bremen had not been good faith or bad faith but rather
reasonableness. Id. On the matter of bad faith the court noted the presence of
the federal statute. The Ninth Circuit said, "because we find that the agreement
is not enforceable as a matter of public policy, we express no opinion as to the
effect of [the federal] statute on forum selection agreements . . . [the] statute
exemplifies congressional recognition of the unequal bargaining position of
passengers and vessel owners, and the need for independent examination of the
fairness of this type of contract." Id. n. 12. This may explain the Ninth Circuit's
position regarding the reasonableness of the forum-selection clause, or rather the
lack of reasonableness. Nothing in the Supreme Court opinion in Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute addresses the issue of free bargaining power as Congress
intended it to be addressed in statute. While the Court gives lip service to
examination of the statute and the forum-selection clause it is mere lip service
because of the Court's failure to look at the context of the clause and the
presence of other clauses. The whole demonstrates a clear intent to exculpate
Carnival in violation of the statute.
270. Carnival,499 U.S. at 595, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
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Federal law, specifically 46 U.S.C. § 183(c), prohibits the owner of
a passenger vessel, transporting passengers between ports of the
United States or between a United States port and a foreign port, to
insert an exculpatory clause for bodily injury arising out of
negligence or fault of the ship owner or its agents, servants, and
employees. 27 1 The law declares all such attempts to be null and
void whether they are rules, regulations, or contractual
provisions. 272 The federal statue also prohibits liability limitations
on other attempts to lessen or weaken the rights of claimants at
trial. This2 73latter, much less specific clause was the one at issue in
Carnival.

There is irony in the Court's reasoning. By taking up the
cudgel of contract instead of the chisel of constitutional law, some
sharpness was lost. Any complete analysis of contractual intent
includes an examination of the language of the parties' other
provisions and then a look at the circumstances and purposes to
determine what is otherwise supposed to be an objective question.
What the Court offers falls short of the model. How careful was
the Court's examination of intent without some accounting for the
In the
exculpatory clause that was part of the boilerplate?
appendix to the dissent in Carnival,there is a reproduction of the
Remarkably, neither the majority nor minority
full ticket.
considered or even mentioned the other terms of the contract.
They looked only at Paragraph eight. Paragraph four, however, is
significant and was completely ignored by the Court. A number of
the clauses in Paragraph four deal with limitations of rights. What
damns Carnival Cruise's intentions and yet is ignored by the Court
is the clause forbidden by the federal statute. Paragraph four
provides:
The Carrier shall not be liable for any loss of life or
personal injury or delay whatsoever wheresoever arising
and howsoever caused even though the same may have
been caused by the negligence or default of the Carrier or
its servants are agents. No undertaking or warranty is
given or shall be implied in respecting the seaworthiness,
fitness or condition of the Vessel. This exemption from
liability shall extend to the employees, servants and agents
of the Carrier and for this purpose this exemption shall be
deemed to constitute a Contract entered into between the
passenger and the Carrier on behalf of all persons who are
271.

46 U.S.C. § 183(c) (2000).

272.
273.

See id.
499 U.S. at 596-97, 111 S. Ct. at 1528-29.
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or become from time to time its employees, servants or
agents and all such persons shall to this extent to be
deemed the parties to this Contract.
Can one imagine a more bald-faced violation of 46 U.S.C §
183(c)? It so closely reflects the language of the statute that one
might think the lawyer was consulting the federal statute when
drafting a provision in violation of it. There can be no doubt about
its import, its intent, or its bad faith.
If one looks at the forum-selection clause in its context, one
can see that the Shutes did more than acquiesce to its inclusion.
There was not a bargained-for exchange except by virtue of the
objective manifestation of assent that ignores their actual
knowledge and intention. One must also assume that the Shutes
acquiesced to the violation of federal law and chose to limit their
own right to sue.
Even acquiescence is an amazing conclusion to be drawn from
the objective manifestations of the Shutes and Carnival. While the
intent of Carnival was plain, the intent of the Shutes was more
opaque. Yet unadulterated objectivity would give us the result the
Court accepts. 274 The Court gave its imprimatur to an outrageous
violation of federal policy in an attempt to pursue a fictional intent.
There is nothing about the bargaining or economic justification of
shared costs or the idea of a lower-price contract to justify the
violation of Congressional intent. Instead, this contract is all about
the bargaining power of Carnival Cruise Lines expressed through
their ability to impose terms on parties who did not know of the
terms and could not have learned of them until after the
nonrefundable ticket had been purchased.
One last point of confusion between forum selection and
contract doctrine needs to be addressed. The majority appears to
rely, at least in part, on a supposed concession of notice by the
Shutes. A concession of notice of the term would suggest a

274. The Shutes essentially gave up their right to sue given the three layers of
protection within the provisions of the ticket: a forum-selection clause, a statute
of limitations provision limiting their rights to six months, and a filing of the
multiple level of exculpation. These provisions are analogous to alternative
pleading by providing that you have no right to sue, but if you should sue you
will lose your rights after the passing of six months, notwithstanding the fact
that if you do bring suit within six months you had better be willing to travel to
Florida. How can these multiple layers of protection be seen to the Court as
anything in the nature of or close to good faith on the part of Carnival Cruise
Lines?
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concession of acquiescence to the exculpatory clauses. 275 The
Court does more than suggest the presence of notice. It takes
notice and uses it as the basis for aglying the Bremen requirement
of a freely bargained exchange.
This is unjustified. The
majority states:
Respondents essentially have conceded that they had notice
of the forum-selection provision. Brief of respondents 26.
("The respondents do not contest the incorporation of the
provisions nor [sic] that the forum selection clause was
reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much as
three pages of fine print can be communicated").277
The language from the Shutes' brief supplies more context than
the Court's opinion:
The Forum Selection Clause Is Unenforceable Because It
Was Not Freely Bargained For Between The Parties To
The Contract.
275. Another author has criticized the Supreme Court's misapplication of the
unconscionability doctrine in CarnivalCruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute. Jeffrey A.
Liesemer, Note, Carnival's Got the Fun... And the Forum: A New Look at
Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine after Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1025 (1992). In his Note, Jeffrey
Liesemer says forum-selection clauses in form contracts are not supposed to
receive favorable presumptions and thus the Court wrongly decided Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute. Id. at 1029. Liesemer argues that the Shutes had no
real notice although the Court claims they admitted to it in their brief. Id. at
1049. He also noted the Court's missed opportunity to save the clause generally
while condemning its use where the Shutes had no real opportunity to negotiate
and no real choice. Id. at 1048. He argues that because of Shute, the
unconscionability standard in the context of forum-selection clauses is now
nearly impossible to meet; thus the Court missed an opportunity to "perpetuate
the benefits of forum clauses in 'bargained for' agreements while avoiding the
harsh result rendered in this case." Id. at 1059-60.
276. Carnival,499 U.S. at 595, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. This is an incredible
failure on the Court's part. This is because the Court determined that it would
avoid the question of minimum contacts and forum-selection clause issues on
the basis that the parties freely bargained for and assented to Florida as the only
forum permitted. In other words, the Court took a concession from the
minimum contacts issue, used it as the basis for the contract argument and then
used the contracts issue to avoid the very constitutional law issue from which
the concession is derived. This is an unfair blind-side tackling of counsel as the
court below was not offered an adequate opportunity to address what became the
determinative matter.
277. Id. at 591, 111 S. Ct. at 1526.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Petitioner spends considerable time in its brief discussing
whether the forum selection clause was incorporated in the
ticket and that it was reasonably communicated to the
respondents. These are not relevant issues in this case.
The respondents do not contest the incorporation of the
provisions nor that the forum selection clause was
reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much as
three pages of fine print can be communicated. The issue is
whether the forum selection clause should be enforced, not
whether Respondents received the ticket.278
The Shutes did not concede the presence of a bargain, nor did
they concede notice for bargaining purposes. 2 79 Their concession
was made in the context of a response to an argument the Shutes'
counsel thought was irrelevant. It was a response to Carnival's
argument that the forum-selection clause was enforceable as a
freely-bargained contract. The brief goes on to argue:
Petitioner is a large corporation while Respondents are
inexperienced and unsophisticated in business matters. The
forum selection clause was part of Petitioner's standard
contract that had not been negotiated or modified, unlike
the contract in Bremen, which had been negotiated and
modified. As the lower court found, "the provision is
printed on the ticket, and presented to the purchaser on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis." The ticket contract also seems to
278. Brief of Respondents at 26, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647).
279. The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the Ninth Circuit conceded the
presence of notice for bargaining purposes. 499 U.S. at 590, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
This was less than honest and open. Far from conceding the presence of notice,
the Ninth Circuit denied its very presence. Notice was more than just doubtful,
as the Supreme Court would like us to believe. However, because notice was
not critical to the Ninth Circuit's determination, they left it with the tagline of
doubtful rather than electing to resolve it. 897 F.2d 370, 389. Thus, the lack of
bargain, the inconvenience, and the difficulty of enforcing the forum-selection
clause made its enforcement unreasonable. Id. In recognition of the holding of
Bremen this makes good sense. The clause should have been set aside because
the party challenging it, the Shutes, "show[ed] that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud
or overreaching." Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S. Ct.
1907, 1916 (1972). In this case it was not about notice, but a question of reason
and justice. It was the lack of bargaining that combined with the incredible
hardship of litigating on the Shutes to make the clause unjust and unreasonable.
Carnival,897 F.2d at 388-89.
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prevent a refund for an unused ticket, thereby removing the
passengers[sic] right to seek a refund if the clause were
offensive. In light of these vast differences between the
parties' bargaining positions and the nature of the contract,
the lower court280 correctly did not enforce the forum
selection clause.
This is a clear concession of notice, but only in the context of
the due process inquiry. To concede adequate notice for the
purpose of constitutional fairness is quite different from a
concession of notice as a foundation to the bargain.281
2. What We Have Here is aFailureto Negotiate
CarnivalCruiseLines should have been decided differently. It
is another instance of the adhesive contract in the third group of the
analytical tool offered above. The Supreme Court focused on
abstract "reasonableness" without connecting it to the inquiry of
assent from which it originates. This overlooked the substance of
280. Brief of Respondents at 28, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (citations omitted).
281. The Ninth Circuit correctly and appropriately noted that the forumselection clause upheld in Bremen was the result of a "large, complex
commercial contract between two sophisticated parties." 897 F.2d at 388.
There was no evidence in Bremen that the parties were in unequal bargaining
positions or that there was anything adhesive about the contract. In essence it
was a thoroughly negotiated and carefully crafted contract between two
sophisticated parties. Although the Ninth Circuit could have been clearer, it is
obvious that their rejection of the forum selection clause in Carnival had two
bases. The first is that the sophisticated parties and relative bargaining power of
the parties in Bremen makes that case a particularly bad analogy to compare
with someone in the situation of the Shutes. In the Shutes' case, the provision
was printed on the ticket and presented to the purchaser on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Id. The court then wrote about the notice and bargaining that occurred in
the Shutes' case: "Even if we assume that the Shutes had notice of the
provision, [here footnote 11 adds this textual statement, 'This itself is doubtful,
as the Shutes apparently did not have an opportunity to review the terms and
conditions printed on the ticket until after the ticket was printed in Florida and
mailed to them in Washington. Thus, the transaction was completed before the
Shutes ever saw the ticket's terms and conditions.'] there is nothing in the record
to suggest that the Shutes could have bargained over this language. Because this
provision was not fairly bargained for, we hold that it does not represent the
expressed intent of the parties, and should not receive the deference generally
accorded to such provisions." Id. at 389, n.11. This seems a completely fair and
accurate reading of what had been said in Bremen.
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Bremen as well as classic adhesion doctrine. 282 The Court noted
the routineness of passage contracts and the likely standardization
of their terms. 283 It recognized that there will be little negotiation
or even the availability of bargaining. 284 Yet the Court concluded
that the crucial business context differences made a finding of
unreasonableness
under Bremen's holding a distortion of that
28 5
holding.
The Court appeared sanguine about the enforcement of a clause
that was not bargained for and perhaps not even known by the
passengers because of the likelihood that it would produce savings
that the parties would share.28 6 The only authority for this is an
opinion by Judge Posner in Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Donovan.2 , Judge Posner gave the traditional and forceful
intuitive economic defense of forum-selection clauses. He wrote:
We may assume, since the market in surety bonds is a
competitive one, that the cost savings that accrue to
Northwestern from contractual terms that facilitate the
enforcement of one of its bonds will be passed on, in part
anyway, to the purchaser of those bonds-the enterprise in
which the defendants invested-in the form of lower
premium. If so, the defendants were compensated in
advance for bearing the burden of which they now
complain, and will reap a windfall if
288they are permitted to
repudiate the forum selection clause.
282. Here is what the court said in addressing the issue:
In contrast, respondents' passage contract was purely routine and
doubtless nearly identical to every commercial passage contract issued
by petitioner and most other cruise lines. In this context, it would be
entirely unreasonable for us to assume that respondents-or any other
cruise passenger-would negotiate with petitioner the terms of a
forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket.
Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract
the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual
purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise
line. But by ignoring the crucial differences in the business contexts in
which the respective contracts were executed, the Court of Appeals'
analysis seems to us to have distorted somewhat this Court's holding in
Bremen.
499 U.S. at 593, 111 S. Ct. at 1527 (citation omitted).

283. Id.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id.
Id. See supratext accompanying note 251.
916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 378.
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There are two things to note about this support offered by the
Supreme Court. The first is that Judge Posner did not suggest that
forum-selection clauses always produce savings. It is critical to
Judge Posner's opinion that the parties were two business entities
negotiating a transaction in which there was bargaining power and
an opportunity to bargain.289 Judge Posner's rationale would not
have been applied in the Carnival situation.
In fact the Court's
invitation of Judge Posner's opinion almost rises to the level of
ironic humor. Just before reaching the conclusion that the fully
bargained-for and commercial transaction in Donovan would
produce mutual savings, Judge Posner had this to say about other
situations in which mutual bargaining was lacking:
Form contracts, and standard clauses in individually
negotiated contracts, enable enormous savings in
transaction costs, and the abuses to which they occasionally
give rise can be controlled without altering traditional
doctrines, provided those doctrines are interpreted flexibly,
realistically. If a clause really is buried in illegible "fine
print"-or if as in Shute it plainly is neither intended nor
likely to be read by the other party-this circumstance may
support an inference of fraud, and fraud is a defense to a
contract. There was no burial in fine print here. The print
is small, but it is not fine; it is large enough that even the
pale copies in the appendix on appeal to be read
comfortably by the author of this opinion, with his heavily
corrected middle-aged eyesight.29 '
Judge Posner's call to traditional contract doctrines could be
the Orders of the Watch in this Article. We need not do more than
289. Id. at 374, 378.
290. Id. at 377.
291. Id. at 377. In an even more telling passage in the opinion Judge Posner
writes:
We acknowledge a tension between our approach and that of the Ninth
Circuit in Shute v. CarnivalCruiseLines... which refused to enforce a
forum selection clause contained in a form contract that had not been
negotiated. The opinion bristles with hostility to non-negotiated form
contracts, but the facts were special. A passenger was injured on a
cruise ship and brought suit. The cruise line sought to dismiss the suit
on the basis of a forum selection clause printed on the passenger's
ticket. The ticket had not even been mailed to the passenger until after
she bought it, and as a result she had had no knowledge of the clause
until the transaction was complete. If ever there was a case for
stretching the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was
Shute; and perhaps no stretch was necessary.
Id. at 376 (citation omitted).
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be sensitive to traditional contract doctrine. By proper alignment
of adhesion and unconscionability, we can avoid over breadth in
our characterization of assent and bargaining as objective in nature.
In short, there is no valid authority for the proposition that a
savings can be assumed where the parties have not freely
bargained for the clause. If anything, the lack of bargaining and
lack of power to bargain suggest a non-competitive situation in
which any resultant harsh terms will impose greater and
unforeseen costs on the weaker party. They will certainly not
indicate shared savings.
The opinion's weaknesses are all the more apparent when it is
contrasted with the analyses found in Armendariz and Henningsen.
Let us begin with the earlier of the two doctrines, that of adhesion.
Classic adhesion was much more than another way to avoid an
unfair contract, much more than the twin of unconscionability that
CarnivalCruise Lines seemed to lay out. In its origins it cuts to
the basis of contract.292 Contract not only hinges on this exchange
of promises or a bargained-for exchange, it also rests on a
fundamentally objective view of the exchange.293 The opposite
view, that there must be some metaphysical meeting of the minds4
some subjective agreement, has long been a very minor theme.29
It is the appearance to the reasonable mind, the reasonable factfinder, that there has been an exchange which is most often
determinative. It is not the actual presence of an intention to
exchange that is valued.295
We can see how this ticket to cruise became adhesive. When
the ticket arrived in the mail it was already non-refundable. If the
Shutes had sat down and read their tickets carefully they might
have recognized the exculpatory clauses and perhaps understood
them. Any enlightenment should have brought some distress.
What they would not have gained is any power to alleviate the
distress, at least not through bargained-for exchange. If the Shutes
cared at that point to protest the terms there was no direct evidence
of Carnival's response, but there was an overwhelming inference
of what would happen. The almost certain response: Buzz off.

292. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 and § 71 (1981).
293. Farnsworth, supranote 12, § 3.6, at 117-18.
294. Murray, supranote 12, § 30, at 63.
295. Id. "The controversy has been resolved. Contract law abandoned the
theory of subjective intention as unworkable." Id.; see also, Lucy v. Zehmer,
196 Va. 493, 503, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1954) (subjective intent to bluff or to
play a practical joke is irrelevant to the question of objective manifestation of
intent to make an offer).
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You have paid, sail or not as you wish. Or maybe to paraphrase
the Beatles, "You've got a ticket to cruise and we don't care."
This is an adhesive contract. 296 What appears to be bargaining
is in fact completely devoid of the elements of a bargained-for
exchange. This is not to say there was no contract between the
Shutes and Carnival Cruise Lines; to the contrary, it is almost
indisputable that there was an agreement. After all, the cruise was
paid for and completed. What is far less apparent is the extent to
which the terms of that agreement should be enforced.
If we begin with the assumption that this was a contract of
adhesion we should then ask whether it is fair to enforce the terms.
Those terms which stretch our notions of objective bargaining past
the breaking point are not to be included even though the
agreement will be enforced. Judge Easterbrook offered the
example of a packaging inset that added $10,000 to the price of
9
software. 297
A bargain concluded at one time should not be
modified by later terms that bear no resemblance to the original
terms and cannot be said to be fair and reasonable additions given
the reasonable expectations of the parties. The context of the
bargain, relationship of the parties, frequency of dealings, past
performance and their relative bargaining power ought to be
important factors.
These factors not only enhance the
reasonableness of expectations, but also give objectivity the
vitality it needs to allow for changing practices and to respond to
obvious grabs.
Some would start with the finding of adhesion and then address
the conscionability of the forum selection clause.2 98 This is overly
cumbersome and confusing. It invites a repeat of the procedural
question as part of the very popular Leff two-prong-test of
procedure and substance. It also ignores the vital role adhesion can
continue to play in modem contract law and practice. The analysis
296. The court of appeals was unimpressed with the bargained-for exchange.
The court concluded that any appearance of bargaining over the forum-selection
clause was a farce. The transaction was completed; the ticket price paid, and
only then was the ticket issued. By issuance, when the terms were available, the
price was completely non-refundable and any notice of terms offered no
opportunity to bargain. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.3d 377, 389
n. 11 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
297. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
298. See Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, 961 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1992).
In this case the issue was the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The
court held that "[a]dhesion contracts are not automatically void. Instead, the
party seeking to avoid the contract generally must show that it is
unconscionable." Id. at 1154.
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in CarnivalCruiseLines may have been offered in good faith. If it
was, then it amounted to a frolic and a folly within contract
doctrine and can be excused only by the influence of the very
constitutional law issues the Court sought to avoid. 299 Perhaps the
constitutional doctrines of minimum contacts and choice of law
called up "fairness," and this was allowed to influence the contract
analysis. Fairness is so close to the substantive part of the Leff
two-prong that it offers an easy detour after passing through the
first prong, that of procedure. Bargain equals fair procedure and
then cost savings equals fairness. This demonstrates the weakness
of contract doctrine as much as it points out the failings of the
majority opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION

Adhesion and unconscionablitiy share much, but should not be
confused. Adhesion is a fictional concept developed by certain
industries that had early experience with the economy of scale.
For instance, insurers, common carriers, shippers, warehousemen,
and employers have all been the beneficiaries of mass marketing
and therefore mass or standard form contracts-the so-called offthe-shelf deal. It is a doctrine that has developed after the rise of
objectivity and asks a basic question: Can contract exist where the
agreement is more about take-it-or-leave-it terms than it is about
the willing exchange of mutual obligation?
Adhesion is fundamentally a question of the triumph of form
over substance. In some cases, the courts decided that substance
should win out and that they would not apply the doctrine of
objectivity where the subject matter was a violation of public
policy. The classic follow-up question to a finding of adhesion
was whether adhesive contract violated public policy. That is,
adhesiveness alone did not void these untraditional deals. It was
the lack of genuine bargain together with a violation of some
significant policy that made them unacceptable as contracts
Unconscionability in contracts comes from quite a different
tradition. It also differs from adhesion in that the court need only
decide that it would shock the conscience for the court to refuse
enforcement. While this has been expressed as a question of
procedural and substantive limits in bargaining, no one formula is
appealing enough to draw all suitors.

299. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589, 111 S. Ct.
1522, 1525 (1991).
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Adhesion should be a complement to unconscionability, but
used with recognition that gross unfairness and shock-theconscience foulness are not required to void a contract term on
account of adhesiveness. Adhesion should encourage us to look
behind the appearance of bargaining, even when presented in an
objective form if that form overrides the basic sense of justice
inherent in contract law. Contract calls us to enforce promises
because they carry the imprimatur of assent. We need not throw
out objectivity, but we should be particularly vigilant to the
absence of assent in standardized transactions like the ones in
Lockwood, Henningsen, Shute, and Armendariz. All four were
opportunities for abuse by way of a standard form. Standard forms
allow abuses to develop as the routine is transformed by changes
which, if substantial, mark a radical break from the expected. It is
this element of surprise that is both inherent in their use and
essential to their economy.
Validations of standard forms create a paradox in an evolving
economy. Their premise is that standardization saves transactional
costs. Yet standardization requires some rigidity. But goods and
services change or the sophistication of the seller increases because
of the large number of transactions undertaken. To be the most
efficient competitor the envelope needs to be pushed. This puts the
contract drafter ahead of the expectations of society and
encourages changes to stay with that forward curve. Standardized
forms then are typically quite a bit beyond the leading edge of
public perception. The consumer of standardized deals becomes
an experimental subject.
Sellers stretch to accommodate new patterns and transactions
yet they continue to use the standard form. They do so while
trading on a public perception of the forms as typical and ordinary.
All the while, the marketer introduces inevitable change because
commerce changes. The continued presumption of assent must at
some point fail
For this purpose, it is helpful to look at the assent as one of
three types: (1) was the deal in the nature of a take-it-or-leave-it
transaction because one of the parties was unwilling to bargain and
was in a position to impose, or (2) were the circumstances or
process of the transaction such that no bargaining was expected, or
(3) were the circumstances or process such that, despite bargaining
over some terms, ignorance of other terms was the reasonable
expectation of the parties. If it is concluded that one of these three
patterns fits the transaction the contract ought to be viewed as
adhesive. This does not mean unenforceable. We can reinforce
the objective theory of contracts and come to a fairer
representation of the actual agreement if we enforce the deal, but
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refuse to enforce those terms which are unfair surprises or would
result in unexpected harshness. At the heart of this analytical
model is a recognition of the need to resolve the tension between
the objective and subjective conceptions of contract by careful
examination of the quality and quantity of bargaining. It is a
question of reasonable expectations and therefore interpretation,
construction, and gap-filling.

